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Abstract 
Do lower policy-induced barriers to international trade promote economic growth in countries 
with poorly developed institutions? Several studies find that there is a general and positive 
relationship between trade openness and growth on average, but many of them contain 
methodological shortcomings and considerable unexplained variation in the results. I propose that 
good institutions of conflict management are a contingent and mediating factor that can help 
explain data heterogeneity. Without such institutions, countries that integrate with world markets 
become vulnerable to external shocks, possibly unleashing domestic conflicts and uncertainty 
that are detrimental to growth. The hypothesis is given empirical support by analysing an 
interaction variable between openness and institutions, integrated in a growth regression for a 
sample of 94 countries. The interaction variable is positive, significant, and robust to a standard 
list of control variables. For countries with the least developed institutions of conflict 
management, more openness is ceteris paribus found to reduce growth rates. The results reveal 
the inadequacies of a “one size fits all” approach to trade liberalisation, and indicate that 
complementary institutional reforms may be necessary to reap the full growth effects of 
openness.  
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1. Introduction 
Few questions in economics have been more passionately debated than the relationships between 
trade policy and economic development. Ever since Ricardo launched his theory of comparative 
advantages to fight the English corn laws, economists have been advocating the advantages of 
free trade with well-know arguments: Openness promotes the efficient allocation of resources 
through specialisation and comparative advantage, it promotes competition in national and 
international markets, and openness allows for easier diffusion of knowledge and technology 
across countries. The traditional trade theories in economics employ a static framework in the 
sense that resources and technology employed in production are exogenous in the models. Free 
trade is then seen to promote efficiency through the division of labour and redistribution of 
productive activity across countries, thereby moving the world economy towards the international 
production possibility frontier. As such, a static framework predicts that freer trade will increase 
the level of income.  
 
The next issue then becomes how freer trade will affect long-term rates of economic growth. This 
question is certainly more complex, and may in one sense be more important: Think of a situation 
where the static income effect from trade liberalisation is small compared to the dynamic income 
effect though a change in long-term growth-rates. This may very well be the case, implying that 
policy advice should be based on how trade openness influences income growth rather than the 
income level. Standard static trade theory generally predicts that trade policy as such has no 
effect on steady-state growth rates of output (Rodrik and Rodriguez 2001, 8). More recent 
theories based on endogenous growth propose that the relationship is ambiguous (Grossman and 
Helpman 1991). If specialisation promoted by trade channels domestic resources to a sector that 
enjoys increasing returns to scale, growth may be enhanced. But a technologically backward 
country may risk specialising in non-dynamic industries and lose out on these benefits, 
experiencing adverse effects on growth. Economic theory does not offer clear predictions, and 
ultimately the relationship between openness and growth is an empirical question.  
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A number of important empirical papers1 have addressed this relationship. Most of them find a 
positive relationship between openness and growth, and a scholarly consensus seemed to be 
emerging. The consensus was challenged through an important paper by Rodrik and Rodriguez 
(2001), who argue that the relationship evaporates when correcting for methodical shortcomings 
in the literature. All studies acknowledge that econometric challenges are persistent in the cross-
national regressions employed to examine the question: measurement problems, endogenous 
variables and omitted variable bias are endemic to the regression specifications in general. In 
particular this is true of the indicators employed for openness, and much of the literature is 
concerned with how outward trade policy orientation best can be measured. Although most of the 
studies end up concluding that trade fosters growth on average, there is considerable unexplained 
heterogeneity in the data. All in all, a clear and robust relationship has yet to be established. 
 
This paper starts with the observation that the unexplained heterogeneity in the empirical 
literature might be better understood by looking at contingent relationships between openness and 
growth. The success of outwards orientation in terms of growth performance may depend on 
certain characteristics that enable countries to adjust to the situation introduced by international 
competition. Such a possibility can be linked to the general theory of the second best, as set forth 
by Lipsey and Lancaster (1956): Implementing free trade may not be an optimal response when 
imperfections exist in other markets or institutions. Chang, Kaltini, and Loayza (2005) 
investigate for instance how labour market distortions must be addressed to reap the full benefits 
of international trade, but also suggest that an interaction between openness and other variables is 
important in shaping outcomes. The proposition I advance is that the level of institutional 
development determines how countries respond to the situation imposed by international 
competition. Specifically, if an economy is unable to adequately deal with the external shocks 
that come with integration into world markets, growth can collapse. This argument is developed 
in three steps. First, a model framework developed by Rodrik (1999a) shows how domestic 
institutions of conflict management2 are needed to respond properly to external shocks. If conflict 
management capacity is weak, groups within society have strong incentives to start a costly fight 
to acquire a disproportionate share of resources. Once conflict is unleashed, the costs multiply 
                                                 
1
 Among the more important are Sachs and Warner (1995), Edwards (1998), Frankel and Romer (1999), Rodrik and 
Rodriguez (2001), Wacziarg and Welch (2003), and Noguer and Siscart (2005). 
2
 For instance democracy, a competent bureaucracy, an honest legal system, and institutionalised forms of social 
insurance can contribute toward conflict management institutions that by definition ”adjudicate distributional 
contents with a framework of rules and accepted procedures” (Rodrik 1999a, 386).  
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and the economy may become gridlocked in uncertainty.  Second, an extension model based on 
Rodrik (1991) is developed to illustrate the costs of such uncertainty. It shows that even a 10% 
chance that government will not be able to respond properly to an external shock, will under 
certain assumptions give an implicit expected tax of 44 % on investments – investments that 
often are seen as a key to unleashing growth. Third, to make these results relevant to the 
interaction between openness and institutions, I assume that open economies are more exposed to 
external risk. This assumption is discussed on theoretical grounds, and supported by presented 
empirical evidence. Rodrik (1999b, 40) sums up the argument as follows:  
Openness will leave countries vulnerable to external shocks that can trigger domestic social conflicts and 
political upheavals. These consequences are damaging not only in their own right, but also serve to prolong 
and magnify the effects of external shocks. […] Therefore, the ability to manage turbulence in the world 
economy is a critical component of a strategy of making openness work. 
 
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, I wish to place the proposition I advance in a larger 
context and provide a brief survey of the relevant empirical literature on the effects of both trade 
openness and institutions on growth. Second, I want to test empirically the working hypothesis I 
propose: that the effect of openness on growth is greater when a country has well developed 
institutions of conflict management. Specifically, this implies that the interaction variable 
between openness and institutions is positive, statistically significant and robust to the inclusion 
of relevant control variables.  
 
An empirical analysis is undertaken using historical growth rates in the period from 1975 to 2000 
for a sample of 94 countries.3 Selected components of the International Country Risk Guide from 
Political Risk Services (2005) are used as an indicator of institutional conflict management 
capacity, and average unweighted tariff rates are employed as a variable for openness. The 
analysis shows that the interaction variable between openness and institutions is positive, 
significant and robust to the inclusion of the control variables investments, a human capital 
measure and pre-period GDP to correct for convergence. When the interaction variable is 
included, the openness variable becomes negative. Taken literally, this indicates that countries 
with poorly developed institutions may actually experience lower levels of growth from the 
integration into world markets. The openness variable is robust to the same list of controls.  
 
                                                 
3
 Regressions are done with Stata 7.0. 
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The results therefore seem to lend support to the hypothesis that good institutions of conflict 
management are necessary to reap the full growth benefits of openness. Nevertheless, some 
reservations can me made. First, trade reforms are usually accompanied by other reforms and 
rarely carried out in a ceteris paribus setting. If care is taken to implement complementary 
policies, trade reform can be used as a vehicle for institutional reform. Second, the presented 
results could be more robust if multiple measures of openness and institutions were included in 
the analysis. Good alternative approaches have not been readily available for me within the scope 
of this paper. Robustness checks with alternative indicators must therefore be left to future 
research. Third, finding an interaction effect between openness and institutions is not the same as 
determining the exact channel of the interplay between the two variables. The web of causality is 
complex, and the empirical analysis does not give grounds to exclude the possibility that the 
interaction effect has a different origin.  
 
These reservations not withstanding, the results do show that trade policies work differently in 
different institutional settings. That could serve as a warning against the idea that trade 
liberalisation is a universal policy recommendation for growth: the same medicine may not do all 
patients equally good. Furthermore, the findings can provide some indication that trade 
liberalisation per se may not be the most important contribution to a development strategy for 
countries with weak institutions of conflict management. As such, the analysis points to some 
important areas that policymakers should focus on. However, more research on institutional 
arrangements is needed before exact policy recommendations can be made.  
 
The outline of this paper is as follows: Chapter 2 seeks to give some background and context to 
the topic. Recent trends in development economics and development practice are presented, and 
some clarifications are made. Chapter 3 gives an introduction to trade theory and its predictions 
on the growth effects of freer trade. Chapter 4 surveys the empirical literature on the relationship 
between trade openness and growth. Chapter 5 integrates the institutional aspect, conceptual 
issues are presented, and I briefly survey the literature on how institutions affect growth. Chapter 
6 proposes a theory for why conflict management is important for making openness work. 
Chapter 7 contains the empirical analysis, and conclusions are summarised in chapter 8. 
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2. Trade and development – an overview 
In this paper I will be looking at the impact of economic openness on growth in general, and in 
particular at how the growth effects of trade are influenced by the institutional capacity to 
manage conflicts. The purpose of this particular chapter is twofold. First, I hope to place the 
paper topic within a broader development perspective and indicate how it relates to other research 
and policy controversies.4 Second,  I clarify some issues and concepts that are important to the 
core chapters that follow. 
 
2.1 Trends in development economics 
Theories of economic growth are closely related to development and development economics. In 
fact, both terms have common origins in experiences of the early post WWII era. Decolonisation 
meant that most of the countries that until then had been seen as “backward” gained political 
independence, and a movement to advance their economies was set into motion. The new term 
less developed country was coined to indicate “a country with less advanced technology and/or 
lower income levels than the advanced industrial countries” (Black 2002, unpaged). Being a less 
developed country is certainly a matter of degree and several more characteristics can arguably 
be incorporated into the definition. Still it is clear that technological advancement and income 
levels are the key elements that serve to differentiate a less developed country from an 
industrialised nation.5  
 
An understanding of the forces of development was necessary to meet the policy needs of these 
young, emerging nations. Development economics built on both classical and neoclassical 
                                                 
4
 Trade and development are both complex and sizeable topics, and it follows from the nature of an overview that 
many of the tangent issues will only be presented in a peripheral and superficial way. The purpose of this paper is 
only to address a few of the questions raised. 
5
 LDCs and industrial states are commonly denoted developing and developed countries, respectively. The very 
useful short forms will be applied in this paper, but they can be misleading in at least two ways. First, the distinction 
between developing and developed seems to indicate that advancement and progress in industrial nations have come 
to a halt. Second, the terms may connote to un-neutral and old colonial dichotomies between the civilised and 
uncivilised world. These misinterpretations should in no way be inferred from my usage of the expressions 
developing and developed. Despite all their shortcomings, the terms capture an essential feature of development: the 
advancement of one nation can only be evaluated relative to that of others. 
 6 
foundations, and sought to be the intellectual counterpart to the new political order.6 The 
discipline was analytical and policy oriented, aimed at determining how national strategies 
together with international measures could be better adopted to accelerate a country’s 
development. Up until the mid 1960s, development was understood synonymously with 
increasing income per capita. Market failures were viewed as particularly pervasive in developing 
countries. State planning combined with policies for import-substitution and industrialisation 
were viewed as important steps on the path to prosperity. Continued export of primary products 
was seen as a trap that locked developing nations into poverty. Theories of coordination failure 
were used as an economic rationale for governments to support and own industry. In for instance 
the big push-theory, set forth by Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) and later formalised by Murphy, 
Schleifer and Vishny (1989), a particular market externality implies that a certain fraction of the 
economy must industrialise before it becomes profitable for each individual entrepreneur to bear 
the fixed costs associated with industrial production. Without government intervention, the 
economy will not get the big push in growth that industrialisation is assumed to provide.  
 
In the late 1960s and the early 1970s came a second phase of development economics that 
questioned the postulated equality between development and per capita income: Does growth 
automatically translate into better incomes for all members of society? Increased emphasis on 
poverty and inequality gave new dimensions to the development perspective. The focus shifted 
somewhat from industrialisation to rural development, from physical to human capital. But the 
major change in development economics took place in the 1970s and 1980s, a period marked by 
the revival of neoclassical economics. The focus shifted from market failures to the policy-
induced distortions caused by state interventions. “Getting prices right” became a slogan for the 
new view that market-based outcomes normally gave the best prerequisites for development. The 
state was now to concentrate on stabilising the economic environment and assume a more passive 
role. Outward-oriented policies and trade liberalisation replaced import substitution as the leading 
policy recommendation.  
 
With the increased application of rationality-based economic models, development economics is 
reintegrating with other economic disciplines. Very roughly, one can sketch an evolution where 
                                                 
6
 Meier and Rauch (2000, 69-74) present a good historical summary of development economics. I follow them in 
dividing the discipline history into three distinct phases. 
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before, neoclassical economics was considered a special case only relevant for developed 
countries. Now, development economics became the special case of neoclassical economics 
applied in a development setting (Meier and Rauch 2000, 71). Although few would conclude that 
the discipline has lost its raison d’être, these changes led Hirschman (1981) to write an essay 
with the telling title “The rise and fall of development economics”. Huge global income 
differences – the question of why some countries produce so much more output per worker than 
others, as Hall and Jones (1999) phrase it – is nevertheless still a research area where many 
economic questions are left unanswered. Improved knowledge and better policies in this area 
could have massive welfare implications. In more modern research, the structural focus 
characteristic of dependency theory tends to be replaced by studies that explain the heterogeneity 
within the developing world. There has also been a more recent trend to put increased emphasis 
on institutional factors, as can be seen for instance in a renowned paper by Acemoglu, Johnson 
and Robinson (2001).  
 
Questions related to economic openness and trade have been central to all phases of development 
economics. As such, there are a number of excellent contributions that are relevant to this paper. 
My particular approach to the topic, employing cross-national regressions and focusing on 
institutional parameters, is most related to the newer research contributions that will be presented 
in chapter 4.  
 
2.2 Trends in development practice 
Summarising how development policies have been practised in the post-war era is a daunting 
task, and I will limit myself to a few observations. Development economics has since its 
beginning sought to be policy-oriented, so it should come as no surprise that theory and 
development practice historically have moved along similar lines.  
 
Many developing countries sought non-alignment during the cold war, and endeavoured to 
follow an independent line of development both politically and economically. Many states 
practiced import-substitution for a number of industrial products. In the beginning of the post-war 
era, developing countries took an active part in planning economic and industrial policies. 
Although development economists recommended some of these policies, ideological support was 
also important.  
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The post-war period was a golden era for economic growth in the developing world. A major 
turning point came with the oil and debt crises that arose in the 1970s. The worldwide economic 
crisis marked by stagflation fuelled doubts about the effectiveness of interventionist strategies, 
and paved the way for a more neoclassical policy paradigm. At the same time, substantial oil 
revenues were being channelled to the developing world in the form of loans. Development 
optimism turned sour as international interest rates rose, export commodity prices fell, and the 
cost of U.S. dollar-denominated loans rose with the appreciation of the dollar. When Mexico 
defaulted on its portfolio in 1982 and others soon followed, the debt crisis was officially 
proclaimed. International financial institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank and the IMF were 
lenders of last resort for many of these countries, and became increasingly involved in managing 
the crisis (Killick 1998).  
 
Especially the IMF took from the early 1980s on a new role as gatekeeper of loans and 
investments that many developing countries depended on (Stiglitz 2002). To ensure the 
soundness of existing projects, the IMF required debtor countries to adopt an ambitious agenda 
for economic reform. The policy paradigm adopted is commonly labelled the “Washington 
consensus” and includes fiscal discipline, price stability, privatisation as well as liberalisation of 
trade, investments and capital movements (Williamson 2000, 252). The approach is based on free 
markets and global economic integration as a key to growth and prosperity, a view supported by 
many development economists. A more recent policy trend has put emphasis on governance 
reforms that aim to improve and strengthen quality of judicial, regulatory, monetary, and fiscal 
institutions. Based on the idea that policy changes need strong institutional foundation to be 
effective, the new approach is often labelled second-generation reforms (Rodrik 2004, 2). 
 
Several countries did not agree to conditionality programs with the IFIs, and many of those who 
did still have a long way to go before they become showcase models of the policies advocated by 
the Washington consensus. Current development strategies vary greatly in nature and scope. 
Nevertheless, it is well known that the Washington consensus and the IFIs have both influenced 
local policies and global thinking on development (Williamson 2000, Killick 1998). 
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2.3 Some controversies in trade policy 
“Trade not aid” has long been a slogan for how the rich world should relate to developing 
countries, embraced by various economists and development practitioners on both side of the 
political scale. Although there is a strong consensus in the development community that trade has 
a role in lifting the world population out of poverty, there is disagreement on the extent, method 
and timing of this interaction with world markets. A question that permeates the debate is this: 
Should full trade liberalisation be undertaken based on present advantages that developing 
countries have in primarily agriculture and textiles, or should national trade policy have a role in 
directing domestic resources to industrial sectors where the growth and development potential is 
higher? 
 
The supporters of import substitution obviously believed in the benefits of industrialisation, and 
in promoting it through trade policy measures. In the recent decades, however, a pro-market, pro-
trade movement has dominated development economics and development practice. A good 
example of this evolution is the much cited paper by Sachs and Warner (1995), where the authors 
seek to document some common trends in world economic development after 1975. Trade 
liberalisation and economic openness is seen as the benchmark for the ongoing global integration 
of developing countries. Sachs and Warner argue that only developing countries that are 
integrated into the global economy will be catching up with the income levels of industrialised 
nations.  
 
Scholars also disagree about the universality of policy recommendations are. On the one hand, 
some make a universal case for trade liberalisation, arguing that all countries in all situations will 
reap a net benefit from freer trade. Other researchers argue that trade policy will increase income 
if integrated in a broader policy mix. Still others advocate a country-specific approach, where 
policies should depend on the economic context. In practice, trade reform is often characterised 
by gradualism so economic agents are given time to adjust to the new prices (Melchior 2005, 27). 
Trade also tends to be one of several aspects encompassed in a larger reform programme 
(Wacziarg and Welch 2003). One topic of current interest due to the Doha development round in 
the WTO is the degree of policy space that should be given to national governments, as opposed 
to trade-related policies being determined in international forums.  
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Since trade policy is assumed to affect economic growth, it is generally considered an integral 
part of a national development strategy. However, some scholars have questioned the strong 
emphasis that has been placed on trade policy in recent years. Rodrik and Rodriguez (2001) are 
main proponents on this concern. Although they do not see trade policy as unimportant, they 
worry that the opportunity cost of research and policy development on trade is too high: the focus 
on trade may crowd out reforms and replace an overall development strategy with potentially 
higher growth effects.  
 
Fully addressing these controversies is obviously far beyond the scope of this paper, even though 
the subject matter I deal with is related to most of them. My focus will first of all be to discuss 
the empirical growth effect of trade. Questions related to institutions and policies that are 
complementary to openness will be addressed, but only to the extent that they are relevant for my 
main proposition about how openness and institutions of conflict management interact.  
 
2.4 Important clarifications 
Before proceeding with my paper, I try to clarify how the term openness is employed. Also, I 
briefly discuss how economic growth affects poverty and inequality. The latter discussion is not 
directly related to my main hypothesis, but intended to illustrate an important and related 
message: Even though growth is usually considered an important means to poverty reduction, the 
two variables are neither linearly nor unconditionally related. 
 
2.4.1 Definition of openness 
Large countries usually trade less than small ones. States long distances away from large markets 
usually experience lower export shares. Geography, population, culture, and trade policy are only 
some of the factors that determine the trade volume of a particular country – usually measured by 
the trade share to GDP. In many ways it would be correct to follow Pritchett (1996, 309) in 
defining openness “simply as an economy’s trade intensity.” However, as will be discussed later 
in the review of literature on trade and growth, this definition would capture trade induced by 
factors completely unrelated to trade policy.  But the focus of this paper is how government 
through political strategy can influence trade and growth, and that means examining the effects of 
trade policies rather than trade volumes. It would therefore be more accurate to define openness 
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in relation to barriers to international trade imposed by government authorities. These can take 
many forms and are not limited to tariffs, quotas and non-tariff barriers (NTBs). This theoretical 
definition is in line with a number of research papers studies including Sachs and Warner (1995), 
Rodrik and Rodriguez (2001) and Wacziarg and Welch (2003). How the concept is made 
operational is an integral part of the debate on openness and growth. For a discussion of specific 
openness measure, the reader is therefore referred to later chapters. 
 
2.4.2 Economic growth and poverty 
Then to economic growth. A development strategy captures the notion of policies implemented 
intentionally to effectively improve welfare in a country. Economic growth (and thus income) is 
normally an important means to this end, and used as a measure of how well a country is 
performing. Nevertheless, there are at least three reasons to caution against the unconditional use 
of per capita GDP as a measure of development (Meier and Rauch 2003, 5). First, since per 
capita GDP is a simple average, distributional consequences are hidden. A rich minority can raise 
GDP with no effect on poverty reduction. Second, GDP is not a measure of welfare. There are 
many examples of countries with similar income levels and widely differing average levels of 
health or life expectancy. Third, price levels vary across countries so that mere exchange rates 
give a misleading interpretation of income levels. Conversion into purchasing power parities 
(PPP) improves the fit, even though distortions may still exist. In sum, it could be argued that 
income levels are a good signal of welfare, but should be complemented by other indicators in 
measuring development.  
 
Does this imply that economic growth not necessarily is a means to achieve poverty reduction? 
Kuznets’ (1955) renowned inverted u-hypothesis argues that economic growth will lead income 
inequality to first rise and then fall with development. If true, this could imply that sustained 
poverty and economic growth can co-exist as phenomena in the developing world. However, only 
mixed empirical support has been found for the inverted u-curve (Meier and Rauch 2003, 376). 
Another question is how trade liberalisation specifically will effect income distribution, since it 
by nature implies economic adjustments and is likely to have effects on inequality. Taylor and 
Ocampo (1998, 1541) cite studies that show improved income distribution in some labour 
abundant economies, but a worsening in income distribution for African economies and several 
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middle-income countries. Dollar and Kraay (2004, F47), however, find no systematic relationship 
between changes in trade volumes and changes in household inequality.  
 
Winters, McCulloch and McKay (2004) (WMM) take a different approach and survey research 
on the specific links between trade liberalisation and poverty rather than inequality. Isolating the 
precise links between the two is an empirically challenging task because the concepts are not 
easily measurable, and because liberalisation is rarely an event that happens in isolation. WMM 
look at an analytical framework with a range of aspects and conclude that although liberalisation 
broadly tends to reduce poverty, existing literature does not warrant a general conclusion on the 
relationship. These reservations not withstanding, I would still argue that economic growth is a 
desired outcome even though poverty reduction and improved welfare do not follow with 
necessity. In the words of WMM (ibid, 74): “The key to sustained poverty alleviation is 
economic growth, as is widely accepted by economists and development practitioners. Although 
growth can be unequalizing, it has to be very strongly so if it is to increase absolute poverty.” 
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3. Trade and growth theory 
There is a large body of empirical literature that has investigated the empirical relationship 
between openness and growth, and for a long time this strand of the literature was developed 
largely independent of formal theory (Aghion and Howitt 1998, 365). The purpose of this chapter 
is to give a brief exposition of the theoretical links between trade and growth. It will be argued 
that theoretical predictions for the effect of openness on steady-state growth are fundamentally 
ambiguous, leaving the burden of proof to the empirical literature that is surveyed in the next 
chapter. 
 
3.1 Classical trade theory 
The Ricardo and Heckscher-Ohlin type classical formal trade models employ a static framework 
in the sense that resources and technology employed in production are exogenous in the models. 
Free trade is then seen to promote efficiency through the division of labour and redistribution of 
productive activity across countries, thereby moving the world economy towards the international 
production possibility frontier. As such, a static framework predicts that freer trade will increase 
the level of income.7 Technology is ascribed a role in determining trade patterns, but the reverse 
arrow of causality is not considered by the classical trade models. Emphasis is almost exclusively 
on the effects of technological disparities rather than its causes (Grossman and Helpman 1995, 
1281).  
 
Although changes in technology and productivity are identified as the fundamental determinant 
of long-run growth, it is not formally linked to the organisation of international trade. In open-
economy versions of the neo-classical growth models, it is international capital flows rather than 
trade flows that would speed up the rate of convergence to the steady states. Classical trade 
models and neo-classical growth models therefore remain silent on the effect of trade on growth. 
Trade liberalisation that improves the income level, implies only a temporarily higher growth rate 
in the transition period. But barriers to free trade are not seen to have an effect on the steady-state 
                                                 
7
 Newer trade models with increasing returns may somewhat nuance this prediction for small countries. 
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growth of output.8 The question of how freer trade will affect long-term rates of economic growth 
is certainly more complex, and may in one sense be more important: Think of a situation where 
the static income effect from trade liberalisation is small compared to the dynamic income effect 
though a change in long-term growth-rates. This may very well be the case, implying that policy 
advice should be based on how trade openness influences income growth rather than the income 
level.  
 
The classical models nevertheless highlight an interesting aspect of trade policy, namely how it 
can create domestic conflicts. Specialisation in a Heckscher-Ohlin model gives a net gain, but 
does imply domestic winners and losers as resources are shifted from one sector to another. 
Similarly, the Stolper-Samuelson theorem is often used to illustrate how changes in income 
distribution can explain domestic opposition to free trade. In a two-good, two-factor model 
(labour and capital) with constant returns to scale and incomplete specialisation, the theorem 
shows that an increase in the relative price of a good yields an increase in the real return to the 
factor used intensively in that good, with a corresponding decrease in the return to the other 
factor (Leamer and Levihnson 1995, 1349). Owners of capital and workers will therefore have 
opposing interests in trade liberalisation. In chapter 6 of this paper, I argue that domestic conflicts 
are crucial to how a country stands to gain from outward oriented trade policies. I put emphasis 
on domestic conflicts due to external shock, taking trade policy as given, and do not model 
conflicts that arise due to policy changes. Nevertheless, the classical trade models are an 
important reminder of the strong link between trade policy and domestic conflicts.  
 
3.2 From intuitive arguments to trade models with endogenous growth 
Even though the classical trade models generally failed to make the formal link between trade 
and technological progress, more qualitative arguments were still present in the debate 
(Grossman and Helpman 1995, 1281-2). Openness was seen as having manifold benefits for the 
economy both due to imports and exports. The principal idea is that trade promotes the diffusion 
of knowledge and technology across countries through several channels. First, domestic firms 
have better access to ideas, intermediate goods and services, machinery, and capital under open 
                                                 
8
 Ventura (1997) is a much cited exception to the general view that classical trade models are not linked to long-run 
economic growth. He points out that for trading economies, given a weak form of the factor price eqalisation 
theorem, the assumption of diminishing returns will apply to world averages rather than the individual economies. 
Convergence is thus a result of structural changes in the economy rather than diminishing returns to capital.  
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trade policies. Second, integration gives access to global markets and better profit opportunities 
to reward successful firms. Third, comparative advantage promotes an efficient allocation of 
scarce domestic resources. Fourth, consumers are better off with access to a greater variety of 
products. Fifth, with the advent of trade models for imperfect competition, openness could be 
used as a tool to break domestic monopolies and improve both national and international 
competition. This list of arguments could without doubt have been made longer and more 
detailed, and few would deny that at least some of these mechanisms are both important and 
relevant. However, the strength, relevance, and validity of each factor for economic growth are 
difficult to address theoretically without a formal modelling framework.  
 
The development of endogenous growth models is often thought to provide that framework, and 
therefore be the missing link between trade openness and steady-state growth.9 A common 
element of these models is that they emphasise non-diminishing returns to certain factors of 
production, for instance learning by doing or other forms of endogenous technological change. 
Grossman and Helpman (1995) survey the modelling efforts made, and argue that one clear 
distinction between the models concerns the driving force behind technological progress. One 
strand of the literature looks at learning by doing, whereby the mere repetition of productive 
activities allows firms and industries to improve productivity. Another strand emphasises 
research and development (R&D) where investments primarily are aimed at innovating new 
technology. Externalities may be present where these investments in knowledge generate 
spillovers and social benefits that are not captured by the private returns individual investors. If 
such spillovers and innovations occur, a crucial question is their extent and scope: Do they spill 
over between firms, between industries, throughout the national economy, or even across 
countries? The assumptions a model makes about the nature of technological innovation, and the 
role of trade in diffusing knowledge, therefore becomes critical for how it evaluates the effect 
openness on growth.  
 
In a very important contribution, Grossman and Helpman (1991) address the question of whether 
trade can promote innovation in a small, open economy – and conclude that it may or may not. In 
particular, the answer depends on whether comparative advantage directs resources away from or 
                                                 
9
 It is beyond the scope of this paper to present the various models more in detail, and will only cite some main 
points. For a complete survey, readers are referred to Grossman and Helpman (1991, 1995) and Aghion and Howitt 
(1998, ch. 11). 
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towards activities that generate long-run growth via externalities in knowledge production. 
Specialisation may therefore either spur or slow down long-term growth. Aghion and Howitt 
(1998, 368-9) sum up the uncertainty of the theoretical predictions:  
 
The effect of the reallocation of resources induced by comparative advantage on growth is ambiguous, and 
depends very much on whether or not international trade in goods is associated with international spillovers 
of ideas. If knowledge spillovers are essentially national in scope, […] the well-understood static welfare 
gains […] may be offset by dynamic growth and welfare effects resulting from changes in specialisation 
patterns, for example with the less developed countries specializing in basic production activities in which 
there is little scope for accumulating new knowledge. 
 
3.3 Ambiguous theoretical predictions: an example model 
Rodrik and Rodriguez (2001) (RR) present a simplified model of Matsuyama (1992) that can 
help to illustrate the forces at work. The implications of varying the import tariff are examined in 
an economy with the two sectors agriculture (A) and manufacturing (M). Learning-by-doing is 
assumed to be external to individual firms, but internal and limited to the domestic manufacturing 
sector as a whole. Labour is the only factor that is mobile between the sectors, and the labour 
force is normalised to unity with a share ( tn ) in manufacturing. Production functions for 
manufacturing and agriculture can then be written: 
 
(E3.1) αttMt nMX =  
(E3.2) α)1( ttAt nAX −=  
 
α  is the share of labour in value added in both sectors (assumed identical for modelling ease), 
and t is a time subscript. A and M are productivity coefficients, the former exogenous and the 
latter a state variable evolving according to:  
 
(E3.3) Mtt XM ∂=  
 
Here, ∂ is a parameter that captures the strength of the learning effect. The economy is assumed 
to have an initial comparative disadvantage in manufacturing. The relative world market price of 
manufacturing is unity, and the relative domestic price is (1+τ ) with τ  being the ad-valorem 
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tariff rate. Equilibrium in labour markets requires the that the value of the marginal product of 
labour is equal in both sectors: 
 
(E3.4) 11 )1()1( −− +=− αα ταα ttt nMnA  
 
By differentiating E3.4 with respect to both tn and τ , it can be checked that an increase in the 
tariff rate allocates a greater share of the labour force to the manufacturing sector: 
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Over time, learning by doing in manufacturing will increase the marginal product of labour in the 
sector. This will increase the labour share in manufacturing. Formally, this can be derived by 
differentiating E3.4 with respect to tn  and tM , and then inserting E3.3 as an expression for 
tdM . For a constant tariff rate, this implies that tn evolves as follows, where tnˆ  represents 
proportional changes:  
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To evaluate the net effect output growth, we first need an expression for the total value of output 
at world prices, denoted tY . Since both relative and absolute world prices are set to unity, this is 
simply found by adding E3.1 and E3.2: 
 
(E3.7) αα )1( tttt nAnMY −+=  
 
The instantaneous growth rate at world prices can therefore be expressed by differentiating E3.7 
with respect to tY , tn  and tM : 
 
(E3.8) [ ] [ ]αααα 11 )1( −− −−+= tttttttt nAnMdnndMdY  
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E3.6 and E3.3 are then inserted for respectively tdn  and tdM . When combined with E3.1 and 
E3.2, this yields the following expression: 
 
 (E3.9) αλ
α
αλ tttt
t
t
t nnY
YY 

	




−





−
+∂== )(
1
ˆ

 
 
The share of manufacturing output in total output is here expressed as t
m
tt YX=λ . All growth in 
this economy takes place in the manufacturing sector through dynamic learning effects, growth is 
strictly positive as long as tn > 0 and larger the greater share of the labour force employed in 
manufacturing. If there is no tariff in place, then tt n=λ and the growth expression E3.9 
simplifies to the following, because the second term cancels: 
 
(E3.10) αλ ttt nY ∂=ˆ  
 
A marginal increase in the tariff rate will have two effects. First, a small tariff will increase 
growth through an enlargement of the manufacturing sector (cf. with E3.5). This is expressed by 
the first term in E3.9. Second, a small tariff would make the labour share in manufacturing larger 
than the manufacturing share of output at world prices ( tt n<λ ). The tariff imposes a distortion 
on the production side because the tariff creates a wedge between domestic and international 
prices, as expressed by the second term in E3.9. This static inefficiency increases as the 
manufacturing sector becomes larger. As such, a tariff implies both a static inefficiency loss and a 
dynamic growth gain. Rodrik and Rodriguez (2001, 12) argue that the sum of these effects means 
that that marginal tariff changes first will have a positive effect on growth until a critical level, 
then growth diminishes in τ . The effect is illustrated in figure 3.1, adopted from RR (2001).  
 
RR (2001, 12-13) conclude that it is  “relatively straightforward to write a well-specified model 
that […] illustrates that there is no determinate theoretical link between trade protection and 
growth once real-world phenomena such as learning, technological change, and market 
imperfections (here captured by a learning-by-doing externality) are taken into account.” 
 
 19 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Relationship between tariff rate and growth, based on RR’s (2001) figure II.1 
 
3.4 Summing up the theory 
Endogenous growth models can be used to describe a scenario where free trade drives economies 
with inferior technology to specialise in traditional goods that reduces long-run growth. As such, 
they can be read as formalisation of the much debated infant industry argument, where temporary 
tariff protection is needed to catch up to the technological frontier. Historically, Prebish (1959) 
gave an important theoretical contribution that became linked to the import substitution policies 
implemented by many developing countries. Prebish argued that the income elasticity of demand 
is lower for primary commodities than for industrial products. Therefore, when global income 
levels increase, countries that have specialised in primary commodities will therefore experience 
lower growth than industrial countries. Trade policy to promote the manufacturing sector was 
therefore needed to ensure long-term growth.  
 
With other underlying assumptions, however, endogenous growth models can also predict a 
positive and universal relationship between openness and growth, irrespective of initial 
technology. Specifically, if knowledge spillovers are global in scope, trade can be an important 
vehicle for technological progress. The majority of theorists seem to support an optimistic view 
on the capacity of trade capacity to diffuse knowledge. Nevertheless, the conclusion from this 
review of trade and growth theory, is that there is no clear, theoretical relationship between 
growth and openness in the existing literature. With ambiguous theoretical predictions, the 
relationship must ultimately be determined by empirical studies.  
tYˆ
τ
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4. Trade and growth – a brief overview of empirical findings 
The literature on trade and growth is extensive, and it would be beyond the scope of this paper to 
give a complete survey. I will therefore limit myself to some important contributions that will 
highlight empirical conclusions and some main controversies. A good point of departure is the 
influential paper of Rodrik and Rodriguez (2001) (RR). From research in the 1990s, there seemed 
to emerge a general consensus that liberal trade policies were positively correlated with growth. 
Rodrik and Rodriguez challenge that consensus by pointing to methodological deficiencies in 
four articles: Dollar (1992), Sachs and Warner (1995), Ben-David (1993) and Edwards (1998). 
The articles were chosen because they are the most cited in subsequent literature and among the 
best known in the field. RR also comment on a methodologically innovative paper by Frankel 
and Romer (1999).  
 
4.1 Dollar’s price level approach 
Dollar’s (1992) ambition is to test empirically that outward-oriented economies grow faster than 
inward-oriented economies. Dollar argues that outward orientation allows countries to use 
external capital to finance development, and that the export growth associated with outward 
orientation is a catalyst of technological advancement. At the time of writing, developing 
economies in Asia had experienced much faster growth than their counterparts in Latin America 
and Africa. Dollar defines outward orientation as a combination of two factors: “First, that the 
level of protection, especially for inputs into the production process, is relatively low (resulting in 
a level of the exchange rate that is favourable to exporters); and, second, there is relatively little 
variability in the exchange rate, so that incentives are constant over time.” (ibid, 524). While 
empirical work thus far had concentrated on the latter of the two factors, the main contribution of 
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Dollar’s paper is to focus on the former by constructing an index for exchange rate distortion. 
The index is shown to be negatively correlated with growth in a subset of 95 developing 
countries measured in the period 1976 through 1985.  
 
The conceptual foundation for Dollar’s work is the law of one price, that predicts the alignment 
of the price of tradable goods when there are no barriers to trade. Instead of attempting to 
construct an index of trade barriers directly, Dollar argues that non-alignment of the price level – 
as measured by the degree of exchange rate distortion – must be an effective measure of the 
protective barriers that distort prices away from their free-trade level. An overvalued exchange 
rate is thought to be supported by protective trade measures and incentives geared towards 
domestic market production, and thus indicative of inward orientation. Indeed, Dollar (1992, 525) 
finds that Latin American and African exchange rates were, on average, respectively 33 % and 86 
% overvalued relative to the Asian rates. He further finds that this index of exchange rate 
distortion is correlated with growth, with the most open quartile exhibiting 4,2 % higher per 
capita growth rates in the 10-year period. Dollar (1992, 540) thus concludes that “these results 
strongly imply that trade liberalization, devaluation of the real exchange rate, and maintenance of 
a stable real exchange rate could dramatically improve growth performance in many poor 
countries.” 
 
In their commentary on Dollar, Rodrik and Rodriguez (2001) argue that a price index for tradable 
goods is an inadequate way of measuring trade protection. Firstly, they show that Dollar’s 
indicator cannot be reconciled with the Lerner (1936) symmetry theorem, which postulates that 
import and export taxation will have equivalent effects.10 In Dollar’s index, export taxes will 
make a country appear to be more outward oriented than import taxes. Secondly, RR argue that 
the law of one price does not hold because empirical studies have found that the nominal 
exchange rate is more important in determining the real exchange rate than transport costs and 
trade barriers. Thirdly, they argue that the index is likely to be affected by trade routes and 
geographic variables and find that more than 50 % of the variation in Dollar’s index is explained 
by a set of geographic variables and a measure of the black-market premium. In sum, they find 
that the index for real exchange rate distortion is an appropriate measure of trade policy only 
                                                 
10
 The Lerner (1936) symmetry theorem is the hypothesis that a tax on all imports will, ceterius paribus,  have an 
identical effect as an equal tax on all exports. Building on the critical assumption that trade is balanced, the intuition 
is that a change in the value of imports must be matched by an equal change in the value of exports. 
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when geography and export-related policies have negligible effects, and when the law of one 
price holds continuously. Since these requirements are counterfactual, RR conclude that the 
variation in Dollar’s index is not driven by trade policy and cannot be used to deduce trade policy 
implications.  
 
4.2 Sachs and Warner’s openness index 
Sachs and Warner’s (1995) (SW) paper “Economic Reform and the Process of Global 
Integration” is an attempt to document some common denominators in world economic 
development between 1975 and 1990. As the categories of the cold war have become 
decreasingly relevant, they argue, we have witnessed a grand integration of national economies 
with the world economy. This integration implies not only increased “market-based trade and 
financial flows, but also harmonization with regard to trade policy, legal codes, tax systems, 
ownership patterns, and other regulatory arrangements” (ibid, 2). SW see trade liberalisation as 
the motor that drives this broadly defined global integration, and consider it the benchmark of an 
economy’s overall reform programme: “The international opening of the economy is the sine qua 
non of the overall reform process” (ibid). Furthermore, they replace the old convergence 
hypothesis of economic growth theory with a hypothesis of conditional convergence: only 
countries that are integrated into the global economy will be catching up to the income levels of 
industrial nations.  
 
In contrast to Dollar, SW take a more direct approach in measuring economic openness. The 
main contribution of their paper to the research on economic openness and growth is the 
construction of a dummy indicator for openness. The SW index of openness is an important 
indicator and has become a much cited point of reference in trade and growth regressions. In the 
dichotomous indicator, a country is classified as closed if it meets any of the following five 
criteria (ibid. 22): 
 
C1) Average tariff rates of 40 percent or more. 
C2) Nontariff barriers cover 40 percent or more of trade. 
C3) A socialist economy. 
C4) A state monopoly on major exports. 
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C5) A black market exchange rate that is depreciated by 20 percent or more relative to the official 
exchange rate, on average, during the 1970s or 1980s. (Sachs and Warner look at growth from 
1965 to 1990).  
 
The rationale for creating a combined indictor is that policymakers can close an economy to 
international trade through many channels. Tariffs and quotas distort trade flows directly, but 
non-tariff barriers also have important effects. Price distortions and unpredictability related to 
currency exchanges can also act as impediment to trade. Institutional arrangements such as export 
marketing boards will, according to the Lerner symmetry (1936), have the same effect as taxing 
imports. A further rationale for such a combined indicator is that these factors often will be 
highly correlated. By merging them into a single variable, econometric problems related to 
multicolinearity can be avoided. In their regressions, Sachs and Warner (1995, 47) find that open 
economies on average grow by an impressive 2.2-2.5 annual percentage points faster than closed 
economies, depending on the specification used. The results are highly significant and robust to 
changes in the list of controls. The channels through which trade affect growth are manifold, 
according to SW: increased specialisation, more efficient resource allocation, knowledge 
diffusion through trade and sharpened domestic competition (ibid, 3). 
 
RR scrutinise these results on two accounts: They first ask which of the five factors C1-C5 that 
are decisive in explaining growth, and find that the strength of the result can be traced to the 
variables black-market premium (C4) and state monopoly of exports (C5). Tariffs and non-tariff 
barriers, which are the most direct measures of trade policy, have more marginal effects on 
growth. The effect of adding C4-C5 to the criterion list, compared to an openness indicator 
consisting only of C1-C3, is to classify as closed an additional 15 African and 12 Latin American 
countries – all of which have lower growth rates than the sample average. The Latin American 
economies are included due to C5, the African economies on account of C4.  
 
Second, RR examine the results by asking how representative C4 and C5 are for trade policies. 
The data for state monopoly on major exports (C5) are taken from a World Bank study of African 
economies that carried out structural adjustment programmes (SAP) from 1987 to 1991. Both 
African economies not under SAPs and non-African economies escape scrutiny. RR argue that 
this creates a selection bias and furthermore show that C4 is virtually equivalent to using a 
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dummy for sub-Saharan Africa: C4 therefore shows that sub-Saharan economies have grown 
more slowly that the rest of the sample, but is uninformative about the trade policies per se.  
 
RR continue their analysis by looking closer at the black market premium indicator C5. They 
claim that such premium levels only arise when an economy experiences sustained 
macroeconomic imbalances that are associated with economic mismanagement and increased 
corruption. This may imply that there is a direct effect of C5 on growth that does not go though 
trade policies:  
It is reasonable to suppose the existence of sizable black market premia over long periods of time reflects a 
wide range of policy failures. It is also reasonable to think that these failures will be responsible for low 
growth. What is debatable, in our view, is the attribution of the adverse growth consequences exclusively to 
the trade-restrictiveness effects of black market premia. (RR 1992, 32).  
 
In sum, RR argue that the openness indicator becomes a super variable that only takes the value 1 
if an economy is non-African and stable in political and macroeconomic terms. Since the 
explanatory power of the indicator comes from C4 and C5 and because these are likely to give 
upwards biased estimates, RR conclude that the SW indicator is a risky basis for drawing 
conclusions about the effect of openness on growth. 
 
4.3 Ben-David on income convergence, Edwards’ openness measures 
Ben-David (1993) is chosen by RR as a representative of the literature that studies income 
convergence amongst countries that undertake trade liberalisation. The factor price equalisation 
theorem predicts that free trade will tend to make factor incomes even out across national 
borders. If countries converge to higher rather than lower income, which in fact took place with 
the advent of a European customs union, that could lend support to the link from trade openness 
to higher levels of GDP per capita. Ben-David seeks to demonstrate that European income 
convergence was due to trade liberalisation by ruling out other plausible explanations. First, Ben-
David argues that convergence was not a continuation of a long-term trend. Second, he shows 
that non-EEC countries experienced convergence after joining the customs union. Third, like 
Sachs and Warner (1995), he argues that there is a global tendency for income convergence only 
among the countries that undertake liberal policies. U.S. states and European countries 
experience convergence because of economic integration, whereas elsewhere there is a current 
trend towards divergence.  
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In response to the first argument, RR argue that the sample is biased because Ben-Davis wrongly 
excludes Germany, and also that a trend of long-term convergence can be demonstrated by more 
recent data. To the second argument, RR use an alternative method to show that some of the 
joining non EEC-members did experience convergence, but not as many as Ben-David claim. In 
itself, this is not a sufficient argument for attributing the selected convergence to trade 
liberalisation. To the third argument, RR claim that the test is insufficient because the U.S. states 
and European countries are geographically adjacent. A better test would be to demonstrate 
convergence among all geographically adjacent regions that liberalise. However, RR argue that 
the examples of Asia and Latin America since the 1960s falsify this hypothesis: Asia diverged 
with open trade policies, and Latin America converged with restrictive trade policies. Finally, RR 
cite Slaughter (2000) who employs a more advanced statistical technique to analyse the sample 
analysed in Ben-David (1993) as well as other samples. Slaughter’s (2000, 1) main empirical 
finding is that there is no “strong, systematic link between trade liberalization and convergence. 
In fact, much evidence suggests trade liberalization diverges income among liberalizers”.  
 
With respect to Ben-David, I would like to add a final clarification on my own account: Even if 
convergence towards a higher level of per capita income were to be demonstrated among 
countries that liberalise, this would only affect the level of GDP and temporarily increase growth. 
A relationship between openness and long-term growth rates cannot automatically be deduced 
from a pattern of income convergence.  
 
In contrast to Ben-David, Edwards (1998) takes a more traditional econometric approach to 
studying openness and growth, and is chosen by RR because of his broad approach to the concept 
of openness. Edwards (1998, 383) argues that two issues are at the core of the controversy 
between sceptics and supporters of trade liberalisation in favouring growth: “First, until recently 
theoretical models had been unable to link trade policy to faster equilibrium growth. And second, 
the empirical literature of the subject has been affected by serious data problems.” Edwards 
points to a theoretical link provided by new growth theorists such as Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(1995), who argue that more open economies have a greater capacity for growth-promoting 
technology absorption. Edwards then does a survey of existing indicators of openness and argues 
that each of the alternative measures has some drawback attached to it. To mitigate the data 
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problems, Edwards suggests a new approach where as many alternative indicators as possible are 
used to verify the robustness of the correlation at hand. In his analysis of total factor productivity 
(TFP) growth, he proceeds to use nine different indicators of openness: three directly linked to 
quotas and tariff levels, five composite indices and finally the black marked premium. He finds 
that all coefficients but one indicator had the expected sign, and that 13 of 17 regressions carried 
out passed standard significance tests. Edwards (1998, 391) thus concludes that “these results are 
quite remarkable, suggesting with tremendous consistency that there is a significant positive 
relationship between openness and productivity growth.”  
 
RR criticise Edwards mainly on the econometric soundness of his approach. In brief, they argue 
that his results are econometrically flawed due to an inappropriate weighting of the data and 
unwarranted identification assumptions. Once these factors are controlled for, only three 
indicators remain significant. RR further argue that these are significant because of poor data 
quality. RR find entirely different data on trade tax revenue as a proportion of total trade using a 
more updated dataset, and argue that their numbers are better because they more correctly reflect 
actual levels of protection. The two remaining variables are subjective measure of trade openness. 
RR argue that these can be problematic because they are constructed ex post, and give examples 
of bias where countries with high growth misleadingly are classified as open. Having controlled 
for empirical shortcomings, RR argue that there is little support in Edwards’ paper for the 
existence of a robust relationship between openness and TFP growth. 
 
4.4 Frankel and Romer’s geographic approach 
A measure of openness that Edwards does not include in his indicator list is the trade share in a 
given economy, measured as (imports+exports)/GDP. One reason for not mentioning the 
indicator may be because it does not measure trade policy per se. A second reason may be that it 
is generally seen to be affected by income levels directly, making it endogenous in growth 
regressions. The novel contribution of Frankel and Romer’s (1999) (FR) paper is to construct an 
instrumental variable (IV) for the geographic component of countries’ trade. In this setting, an 
instrumental variable affects the trade share but is itself unaffected by income or growth. 
Empirical research has shown that bilateral trade flows are strongly affected by geographical 
factors.  
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Through a gravity approach,11 FR (ibid, 380) estimate bilateral coefficients for two counties 
based on a set of geographical characteristics proper: countries’ size measured by population, 
distance apart, a dummy for whether they share a border, and a dummy if at least one of the 
countries is landlocked. FR find that these variables are important determinants of trade 
(R2=0.36). Then, for each country, the fitted values for every trading partner are summed up to 
find the predicted trade share that subsequently is used as an IV-variable in their income 
regression. They find that the IV estimates of the trade share are larger than the OLS estimates: in 
the largest sample a one percentage point increase in the trade share is associated with 
respectively a 0.85 and 1.97 percentage points increase in income (ibid, table 3). The coefficients 
are moderately significant, but the IV and OLS estimates are not statistically different from each 
other. Combined with other tests of robustness, the results give no indication that the original 
OLS procedure was endogenously biased. FR warn that the coefficients are not estimated with 
great precision, but nonetheless conclude that more trade unconditionally raises income. When it 
comes to policy recommendations, FR (ibid, 395) sum up that “our results bolster the case for the 
importance of trade and trade-promoting policies”. 
 
FR acknowledge that a potential limitation of their results may be that geography-induced trade 
affects income differently than policy-induced trade. RR elaborate on this point in their review of 
the article. They claim that the link between income and trade volume does necessarily have 
implications for trade policy, since protectionist measures often work by altering trade content 
rather than mere quantity. Another concern raised by RR is whether FR’s IV-variable is a good 
econometric instrument. If geography affects income by means of other channels than trade, such 
as through tropical diseases that negatively affect human capital, the estimators could be biased. 
To test for this possibility, RR include a new set of geographical estimators that turn out to be 
significant, indicating that non-trade effects of geography may be decisive for the results. The 
trade indicator is no longer significant once geographical controls are included. 
 
                                                 
11
 The intuition for a basic gravity model is that distance is important in explaining bilateral trade flows between two 
countries, much the same way as distance determines the forces of gravity. A model for estimating bilateral trade 
flows between country i and j could be specified as follows: 
ijjiijij SSDT εαααα ++++= 3210 Here, T is 
bilateral trade, D distance apart and S a country characteristic such as size – but also other country features could be 
incorporated. Once the coefficients have been estimated in a first-stage regression, the fitted values can be used to 
predict trade flows. FR use the predicted trade flows to construct trade shares that are entered as an instrumental 
variable in second-stage regressions. Noguer and Siscart (2005) (below) use the same general approach.  
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4.5 More recent research 
I have so far followed Rodrik and Rodriguez’s (2001) paper as a basic structure for this brief 
overview of empirical research on the link between trade and growth. This choice has highlighted 
the different approaches and arguments present in the literature. But this overview would not be 
complete without including more recent research on the topic. In this section I present three 
strands of the literature that I consider to give further insight into the issues at hand. First, a 
deeper investigation into Frankel and Romer’s (1999) geographically based IV-methodology. 
Second, an acknowledged paper by Wacziarg and Welch (2003) that uses an updated version of 
the Sachs and Warner’s (1995) openness indicator and also looks at specific episodes of 
liberalisation. Third, an approach that considers the role of market access in promoting growth. 
For a more complete survey of the recent literature, readers are referred to Winters (2004).  
 
4.5.1 Geography 
In commenting on Frankel and Romer (2001), RR were concerned that geography might have a 
direct effect on growth that did not go through trade – thus biasing their instrumental variable 
through a spurious effect. Several papers address this concern. Frankel and Rose (2002) repeat 
the essential analysis of FR and find that the IV-variable for trade retains all of its magnitude and 
most of its significance even when several different geographic and institutional variables were 
included in the specification. Continental dummies, an institutional measure, distance from the 
equator as a proxy for institutional quality as suggested by Hall and Jones (1999), and a dummy 
variable for a tropical climate were all included in the list of controls. The control variables were 
entered separately into the regression equation. Irwin and Terviö (2002) perform an analysis 
employing FR’s methodology on a broad dataset with observations from before, between and 
after the two world wars. They confirm FR’s results and find them robust to most geographical 
variables except distance from equator (latitude). The OLS estimates consistently show a 
downward bias compared to the IV estimates.  
 
Noguer and Siscart (2005) (NS) also perform an analysis using the Frankel-Romer method and 
substantiate the findings, including robustness to latitude. The additional contribution of their 
paper is twofold. First, they claim to do away with imprecise estimates that only marginally pass 
significance tests. Having improved several dataset shortcomings, all results are significant at the 
95% level. Second, and more importantly, NS perform specifications that include the 
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geographical control variables not only in the second-stage, but also in the first-stage gravity 
regression that provides IV-estimates of the trade share. They turn out to have a significant effect 
on the instrument, thus suggesting misspecification in the original first-stage regression. Arguing 
to have controlled for all other plausible links between trade and income, NS perform the second-
stage regressions and still find a statistically significant effect from trade share on income. 
However, the magnitude has decreased. Depending of which control variable is used, the 
coefficient estimates in NS as well as in Frankel and Rose (2002) range between 0.79 and 1.28 
(measured as the percentage point effect on annual growth by a one percentage point increase in 
the trade share).  
 
Summing up, recent research seems to have adequately addressed Rodrik and Rodriguez’ concern 
that the existing correlation between trade share and income is spurious. However, progress has 
not been made on the question of relevance for trade policy. As RR point out: Although the 
results indicate that geography-induced trade promotes growth, that does not directly and without 
qualification apply to policy-induced trade. Trade policy can also be used to alter trade content as 
well as trade volume. NS (2005, 457) raise these concerns themselves and conclude that “our 
study cannot answer the (interesting and important) question of whether trade policy 
liberalization raises income”. This seems to be a pervasive concern for this type of analysis. 
 
4.5.2 Market access 
Inspired by Frankel and Romer (1999), Romalis (2005) represents an innovative approach to 
analysing the relationship between openness and growth. Instead of using geographical factors in 
constructing an instrumental variable for openness, Romalis’ instrument is market access as 
measured by the United States MFN applied tariff rate. Liberalisation in one large developed 
country is based on exogenous factors and should therefore be less susceptible to the endogeneity 
problems that arise when developed countries themselves liberalise, he argues. More openness 
through greater market access is found to have positive and significant effect on growth. 
Maurseth (2005) argues that the literature is deficient because it does not separate between the 
respective impacts of market access abroad and liberal trade policies at home. Also inspired by 
Frankel and Romer (1999), he creates an approximate measure of market access with a first-stage 
bilateral gravity equation that includes levels of GDP in both countries. The results from a 
 30 
second-stage regression that includes continental dummies indicate a substantial impact of trade 
on growth, though only marginally significant. 
 
4.5.3 Sachs and Warner’s openness indicator revisited 
Wacziarg and Welch (2003) (WW) is a paper that has attracted much attention and is widely 
referred to in the literature. They look back to the basic framework on economic integration and 
openness that was proposed by Sachs and Warner (1995), and extend their approach in two 
important ways. First, they revise the dataset and include information for the 1990s. The SW 
indicator for openness is employed, but found not to be significant for the new period in 
consideration. The indicator also fails to separate converging and diverging economies, with the 
coefficient signs actually indicating more convergence in inward oriented economies. A new 
global economy where most countries are open to at least moderate forms of trade may be one 
possible explanation for the failure of the indicator, WW argue: the openness indicator may not 
be sufficiently rigorous to discriminate between slow and fast growing economies in a context 
where even small trade barriers can have adverse effects.  
 
The second contribution of the paper is to analyse how episodes of liberalisation affect growth 
rates, using the year where the SW switches from 0 to 1 as a measure of liberalisation. WW 
estimate that liberalisation on average raises the annual growth rate with 0.56-1.53 percentage 
points, depending on which controls that are used. In support of their idea that liberalisation 
actually meant an outwards orientation of the economy, WW perform analyses that indicate that 
the trade share of GDP in most periods increased by roughly 5 percentage points. Still finding 
significant effects when the three years immediately following a liberalisation episode are 
excluded, WW takes this as a weak indicator that the results are robust to business cycle 
variations. Because trade liberalisation may go together with other domestic policy reforms, WW 
(ibid, 20) acknowledge that the results cannot be interpreted as the direct effects of trade 
liberalisation per se: “A more realistic interpretation of our estimates is that they capture the 
impact of trade-centered reforms more broadly.” In the final section of their paper, WW discuss 
individual country cases and show that there is considerable heterogeneity in the growth effects 
of trade reform. 
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One potential weakness of the WW results is that they are subject to the Rodrik and Rodriguez  
criticism of the SW openness indicator. In WW’s dataset, only 4 of 42 countries were for the 
1990s classified as closed on the criteria (C1-C3) that related directly to trade policy. The rest 
were classified as closed based on the black market premium (C5) and export marketing board 
(C4) criteria. WW (ibid, 9) themselves recognize that “our status dummy variable for 1990-1999 
is subject to the same objections that RR placed against the SW classification for the 1970-1989 
openness dummy […] [and] also to some extent in terms of [countries’] liberalization dates.” One 
possible implication of the RR critique may be that the liberalisation results reported above no 
longer can be interpreted as exclusively due to trade-centred policy reforms, but must be 
extended to all types of macroeconomic reforms in general.  
 
4.6 Summing up the literature 
Many variables influence growth, and more research is needed to completely understand the role 
of trade in a pro-growth policy mix. In their concluding comments, Rodrik and Rodriguez (2001) 
have two interesting recommendations for future research. First, they argue for an ascetic stance 
in choosing trade policy indicators. Simple tariff averages or non-tariff barrier measures are 
simpler to distinguish from macroeconomic performance, and give quite representative rankings 
of trade restrictiveness across countries, they argue. Second, RR argue that much of the 
heterogeneity in the data might be better understood by looking at contingent relationships 
between trade policy and growth: Trade policy might have different effects on different 
economies, depending on a mediating circumstantial factor.   
 
A conclusion from this brief overview of the literature is that most studies lend support to a  
positive relationship between openness and growth. It should also be clear, however, that 
econometric challenges are persistent in the cross-national analyses of the issue: measurement 
problems, endogenous variables and omitted variable bias are endemic to the regression 
specifications in general, and particularly to the openness measures employed. Although most 
studies find a positive relationship on average, they also stress existing heterogeneity in the effect 
of outward orientation on growth. There is voluminous research on the subject, and many papers 
are motivated by methodological shortcomings of previous work. All in all, clear and robust 
relationships between openness and growth have yet to be established. 
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5. The role of institutions 
The role of institutions in promoting growth has received considerable attention in recent years, 
from both academic and policy circles. In addition to the traditional emphasis on getting prices 
right, the strategies for “good governance” advocated by the IFIs now include institutional 
reforms.12 Improvements in judicial, regulatory, monetary and fiscal capacities are encouraged in 
themselves, and seen as crucial to secure the effectiveness of other reform measures. In academic 
circles, a set of pioneering papers have sought to empirically establish the empirical connection 
between institutions and economic growth – such as Knack and Keefer (1997), Rodrik (1999a), 
Hall and Jones (1999) and Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) and Rodrik, Subramanian 
and Trebbi (2002)13. In the words of Rodrik (2004, 1):  
There is now widespread agreement among economists studying economic growth that institutional quality 
holds the key to prevailing patterns of prosperity around the world. Rich countries are those where investors 
feel secure about their property rights, the rule of law prevails, private incentives are aligned with social 
objectives, monetary and fiscal policies are grounded in macroeconomic institutions, idiosyncratic risks are 
appropriately mediated through social insurance, and citizens have recourse to civil liberties and political 
representation. Poor countries are those where these arrangements are absent or ill-formed.  
 
The purpose of discussing institutions is twofold. First, in this chapter I wish to give an overview 
of the recent literature on institutions and economic growth. Second, in the subsequent chapter, I 
hope to develop a theoretical framework for the main hypothesis in this paper: that the effect of 
trade openness on economic growth depends on the institutional context.  
 
5.1 What are good institutions? 
The above citation from Rodrik points to some factors that are commonly integrated into the 
notion of good institutions, as it has been used in the development literature. Yet the quote also 
illustrates the complex and broad nature of the expression. Indeed, observers have warned that 
the term may become unclear and diluted. On the one hand, there has been a tendency to reduce 
the significance of institutions to a question of property rights, thereby missing many important 
                                                 
12
 According to Chang (2002, 69-70): “Exactly which institutions should go into the ‘good governance’ package 
differs from one recommendation to another. [...] However, this package of ‘good institutions’ frequently includes 
democracy; a clean and efficient bureaucracy and judiciary; strong protection of (private) property rights, including 
intellectual property rights; good corporate governance institutions, especially information disclosure requirements 
and bankruptcy law; and well-developed financial institutions. Less frequently included but still important are a good 
public finance system and good social welfare and labour institutions providing ‘safety nets’ and protecting workers’ 
rights.”  
13
 Even though the institutional perspective is relatively new to economics, it has been discussed in other academic 
disciplines (in particular political science) for a long time.  
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dimensions. Such reductionism has sometimes tended to foster a monocausal view of institutional 
development with particular focus on formally instituted legislation for the protection of private 
property. On the other hand, there are arguably dangers in using a catch-all concept where “all 
good things” are included. Merging different aspects of development in a single variable blurs the 
specific causal relationship at work in stimulating economic growth: Although we are headed in 
the right direction, precise relationships and subsequent policy implications may become difficult 
to draw when the variables are too wide. In sum, it seems that the broad notion opened up for 
new perspectives on development. Still, researchers should strive to define how they apply the 
concept in specific empirical works.  
 
Institutions are by nature difficult to quantify. In applied work, they are usually measured 
indirectly. One common method is to construct institutional indices based on surveys of 
investors, academics and country experts. Rodrik (2004, 7) points to two major challenges that 
arise from such indirect methods: First, the institutional ratings are subjective and assigned ex 
post. The indices therefore run the risk of being influenced by other factors that the institutional 
environment, such as good economic performance.14 Second, even if we assume that institutional 
outcomes are correctly measured, the ratings remain uninformative about the specific legislation, 
rules and institutional design creating that outcome. From empirical work we can for instance 
conclude that growth is spurred when agents feel security for their investments, but not infer the 
specific arrangement that creates the safe business environment. This implies that good 
institutions do not need to be identical institutions, that “effective institutional outcomes do not 
map into unique institutional designs” (Rodrik 2004, 9). Rodrik illustrates the point by comparing 
property rights in China and Russia in the mid-1990s. Russia had established a legal framework 
that was inefficient. China had no legal framework, but offered investors joint ventures with local 
governments. Because the government partners were promised a share in future profits, they 
effectively provided a guarantee against expropriation. Rodrik (ibid.) conludes that “China was 
able to provide a semblance of effective property rights despite the absence of private property 
rights. The Russian experience strongly suggests that the obvious alternative of legal reform 
would not have been nearly as effective.”  
 
                                                 
14
 Some authors refer to this as a “halo effect”. 
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Another possible deficiency in the institutional perspective is endogeneity: Good institutions may 
be both a cause and an outcome of economic wealth. Democratic institutions have in particular 
been subject to a heated debate. The early post-war view that poor countries could not afford 
expensive democratic participation has now turned to a general – if not unanimous – agreement 
that democracy helps development. Even though the reverse arrow of causality from income to 
institutions is an important caveat, most scholars now agree that a move towards better 
institutions can be good for growth.15 If developing countries wait for the more spontaneous 
institutional evolution that took place in the industrial world, it could prove long, costly, and does 
not guarantee desirable results. As a late developer, it would simply be uneconomical not to take 
advantage of learning opportunities from the now developed world.16  
 
Nonetheless, exactly how institutions should be improved in an individual state setting is a matter 
of debate (Chang 2002, 70). One view, advocated by some academics and the IFIs in particular, 
is that more or less the same institutions are good for all countries. This implies that transplanting 
an institutional blueprint from industrialised nations to the developing world should be the 
preferred strategy. An opposing view emphasises that each country has its unique characteristics 
and therefore rejects the notion of universal institutions: each historical stage of development 
requires a unique institutional response. A third perspective can represent a middle ground, 
arguing that different institutions can work towards addressing a set of identical universal 
requirements. If for instance all societies need to institutionalize private property rights, the above 
example of Russia and China shows it can be done by different means. Selective institutional 
characteristics are thereby adopted, but fitted to a national context. This third strategy is 
advocated by for instance Rodrik (2004, 2), who also acknowledges that specific research in this 
is not yet very policy relevant: “What works will depend on local constraints and opportunities. 
The best that we can do as analysts is to come up with contingent correlations – institutional 
prescriptions that are contingent on the prevailing characteristics of the local economy. At the 
moment we are very far from being able to do this for any but a few institutional areas.” 
 
                                                 
15
 See in particular the papers surveyed below. 
16
 Chang (2002) gives an interesting historical overview of development, and argues that such learning is taking 
place. He shows for instance that universal suffrage tends to be established at lower levels of GDP per capita now 
than a century ago, when it was implemented in the now industrialised countries. 
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5.2 Research suggests that good institutions encourage growth 
The papers of Knack and Keefer (1995, 1997) (KK) are often referred to as pioneering empirical 
investigations of the relationship between institutions and growth. The novelty of their approach 
was to use an improved and more comprehensive set of data in measuring institutions, based 
among others on information from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). First published 
in 1982, the ICRG is made available by a private consultancy advising multinationals on country 
risk factors. KK (1995, 207) hypothesize that good institutions positively affect growth because 
economic agents are given incentives to undertake productive activities: “Few would dispute that 
the security of property and contractual rights and the efficiency with which governments manage 
the provision of public goods and the creation of government policies are significant 
determinants of the speed with which countries grow.” KK (1995) find empirical support for this 
hypothesis. KK (1997) further find support for deficient institutions being a key factor in 
explaining why poor countries do not converge to higher income levels, as predicted by standard 
growth theory and the diminishing return to capital. Closely related to these findings, Hall and 
Jones (1999, 84) find empirical support for their hypothesis that differences in output per worker 
across countries to a large extent is related to a variable they name social infrastructure: “By 
social infrastructure we mean the institutions and government policies that determine the 
economic environment with which individuals accumulate skills, and firms accumulate capital 
and produce output. […] Such a social infrastructure gets the prices right so that […] individuals 
capture the social returns to their actions as private returns.” Rodrik (1999a) also finds a strong 
link between certain institutional aspects and growth. Although institutions are generally viewed 
as important, there is no scholarly consensus that they are among the most fundamental causes of 
the large income differences across countries.  
 
Institutions may themselves be endogenous, and this is as mentioned one of the main challenges 
in empirical work. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) (AJR) try to overcome this 
difficulty by introducing a new instrumental variable, namely the mortality of early European 
settlers. They argue that the geographical areas that posed the greatest health menace to potential 
colonisers were less likely to be permanently inhabited by Europeans. In these areas, the 
European colonisers were therefore prone to introduce only a minimal official framework to 
extract resources, rather than set up sound institutions for the protection of property rights. With 
this instrumental variable approach, two conditions are needed to achieve econometric 
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identification using settler mortality. First, variation in settler mortality must be an important 
source of variation for institutional quality today (instrument relevance). Second, settler mortality 
must not have an effect on current income levels through other sources than institutional quality 
(instrument exogeneity). AJR argue that both of these conditions are fulfilled. Through a creative 
plunge into old historical records, they successfully use this technique to give further empirical 
support to the finding that institutions foster growth. Some commentators interpret the AJR paper 
as evidence that different encounters with colonialism is the key to explaining economic 
performance in the developing world today. However, reading too much into the instrumental 
variable is misleading, as AJR (2001, 1371) themselves point out: “Differences in mortality rates 
are not the only, or even the main, cause of variation in institutions. For our empirical 
[instrumental variable] approach to work, all we need is that they are a source of exogenous 
variation.” Summing up, these and several other papers illustrate an emerging consensus among 
researchers that institutions are important in encouraging growth. Yet there is disagreement on 
the policy implications that can be drawn from this. Furthermore, there is still considerable 
controversy as to how important institutions are for growth relative to other factors.  
 
5.3 Links between institutions and openness in the literature 
The literature links institutions and openness in at least two important ways. The first strand tries 
to investigate how important trade openness is relative to institutional factors. The second 
approach is to look at how openness and institutional factors interact, examining if there are 
possible policy complementarities that together can enhance growth.  
 
5.3.1 Investigating relative importance 
Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2002) (RST) represent an interesting attempt to uncover the 
long-run determinants of income and growth. Theory on economic growth has traditionally 
emphasised technological change and the accumulation of physical and human capital. At the 
next level, scholars would be interested in explaining what RST call the “deeper” determinants 
that explain uneven accumulation and innovation. In this field, RST distinguish between three 
schools of thought in the literature, depending on where the main emphasis is placed: either 
geography, integration or institutions. The geographic school puts climate, natural resources, 
transport costs, disease and technology diffusion at the centre of the story. The integration view 
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accentuates the role of international trade in propagating productivity. The institutional school 
highlights the rule of law and a social framework that aligns private and social interests. RST 
acknowledge that a complex web of causal factors are a major impediment to econometric 
research in this area, and that an empirical approach cannot adequately account for centuries of 
history. Nevertheless, RST try to asses these three deep determinants of economic growth vis-à-
vis each other by uniting the instrumental variable approaches developed by AJR and Frankel and 
Romer (1999). Combined with the assumption that geography is exogenous, econometric 
identification becomes possible.17 Using this framework, AJR (2002, 4) find  that “the quality of 
institutions trumps everything else. Once institutions are controlled for, integration has no direct 
effect on incomes, while geography has at best weak direct effects.” This result holds for three 
different samples and also for alternative indicators of geography, trade and institutions.  
 
Dollar and Kraay (2003) (DK) take a different approach to determining the relative importance of 
institutions and trade. They start with a cross-section of countries and substantiate what they view 
as a stylized fact: both factors are important for growth. However, DK argue that there is too little 
variation in the institutional independent variable and too much multicolinearity in the data to 
disentangle the partial effect of each variable. They therefore undertake dynamic regressions 
where decadal changes in growth are viewed as dependent on lagged changes in trade and insti-
tutions, respectively. They follow Frankel and Romer (1999) in using trade shares as measures of 
openness, but use a variety of institutional indicators. With this latter approach, trade has positive 
and significant effects in most specifications whereas institutions are found to play a smaller role. 
DK (2003, 161) conclude that “these results are suggestive of an important joint role for both 
trade and institutions in the very long run, but a relatively larger role for trade in the shorter run.” 
One possible objection to the dynamic specifications is the absence of continental-time dummies. 
When these are added, RST (2002, 17) report that the trade coefficient becomes insignificant.  
 
5.3.2 Investigating policy complementarities 
Chang, Kaltini and Loayza (November 2005) (CKL) is a very recent paper that represents the 
main contribution to the literature strand that examines how openness and institutions interact, 
                                                 
17
 Assuming that geography is exogenous is standard in the literature. This assumption may not be entirely innocent 
if the significance of geography changes over time, for instance if an economic boom in neighbouring countries 
makes a certain location more favourable.  
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looking for a possible role for policy complementarities. The main focus of the paper is on labour 
markets and openness. A model based on the Harris-Todaro framework is presented, showing 
that trade liberalisation in some instances may not increase efficiency if there are distortions in 
the labour market. Even though they do not give specific applications, CKL (2005, 15) argue that 
“the essence of the analysis can be extended to analyze the complementarity between trade 
opening and other reforms.” To econometrically capture possible interaction effects between 
openness (TRADESHARE) and other relevant country characteristics (X), the following single-
variable interaction term is included as an independent variable in the regression specification:  
(E5.1) INTERACTION = TRADESHARE * X 
 
Each interaction term is used separately and entered into the regression specification one at a 
time. CKL use difference equations as an estimation framework, similar to the regressions that 
DK (above) use in the second part of their paper. The empirical analysis shows that there is a 
positive and significant interaction between labour markets and openness, in the sense that more 
flexibility reinforces the growth effects of openness. CKL’s (2005, 23) analysis similarly shows 
that there are important policy complementarities between sound institutions and openness: “The 
beneficial impact of an increase in trade openness on economic growth is larger when society has 
a more efficient, accountable, and honest government and where the rule of law is more 
respected.” There are also statistically significant interaction effects when other factors such as 
human capital investment, financial indicators and proxies for domestic firm-entry flexibility are 
entered into the interaction variable (X). In summary, the authors conclude that the results 
underscore the importance of a comprehensive approach to economic reform.  
 
The CKL paper uses the trade share of GDP as their measure of openness. One weakness of this 
measure is that it is not possible to separate policy-induced trade from geography-induced trade 
(see section 4.4). The link between income and trade volume does not necessarily have impli-
cations for trade policy. Although I believe the CKL makes an important contribution underlining 
policy complementarities, it would be interesting to see the analysis carried out with an openness 
indicator that has more direct implications for trade policy. It would also be interesting to see 
how the model presented for labour market distortions could be extended to include institutional 
factors, as suggested by the authors. The theoretical framework that I present in the next chapter 
to explain why institutions and openness interact, does not build on the CKL model.  
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6. Why institutions and openness interact – a theory 
Rodrik (1999a) hypothesizes that external shocks will have long-term adverse effects on growth 
in societies that do not have the institutional capacity to respond properly to them. He finds 
strong empirical evidence to support that hypothesis. In the present section, I take this framework 
one step further: As long as increased trade openness is likely to expose an economy to stronger 
external shocks, then openness will have adverse effects on growth in economies with weak 
institutional capacity. I develop this argument in three steps. 
 
6.1 The Rodrik framework 
One of the motivations behind the Rodrik (1999a) article is to explain why developing countries 
responded very differently to the shocks they were exposed to in the 1970s, a question that long 
had puzzled scholars of comparative economic growth. Rodrik (1999a, 386) postulates that social 
conflicts have a key role in explaining the variations in response:  
The core idea in this article is that the effect of external shocks on growth is larger the greater the latent 
social conflicts in an economy and the weaker its institutions of conflict management. […] I use the term 
latent social conflict to indicate the depth of pre-existing social cleavages in a society, along the lines of 
wealth, ethnic identity, geographical region, or other divisions. […] By institutions of conflict management, 
I understand institutions that adjudicate distributional contents within a framework of rules and accepted 
procedures – that is, without open conflict and hostilities. Democratic institutions, an independent and 
effective judiciary, an honest and noncorrupt bureaucracy, and institutionalized modes of social insurance 
are among the most significant of conflict management-institutions. 
 
Rodrik gives the example of an economy that has been exposed to a price drop in its main export 
good. The textbook policy response is a combination of devaluation and a tightening of 
government expenditure. In enacting this response, policymakers can choose from a wide menu 
of measures (increased taxes, spending cuts, tariffs, wage controls etc.) and therefore determine 
who bears the cost of stabilisation. If the policy changes are carried out without harming existing 
social and distributional agreements, the shock can be managed. However, if the enacted 
measures trigger social unrest, the economy can be paralysed for years because of inadequate 
adjustments and the possible consequences that follow – such as high inflation, import 
reductions, debt, and exchange rate instability.  
 
Rodrik further presents a simple model to illustrate that social conflict among groups can lead to 
coordination failure. In it, the population is divided into two different groups and the resource 
level is normalised to unity. With the external shock, resources shrink to (1- ∆ ). If the groups 
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choose to cooperate, each group is left with ½ (1- ∆ ). Alternatively, each group can fight to keep 
its previous share of ½ , letting the other group bear the burden of adjustment. Fighting or non-
cooperation in itself induces a new cost that magnifies the effect of the original shock. The new 
cost is incorporated into the catch-all variable K that Rodrik (ibid, 392) exemplifies with “the 
damage done to economic activity by macroeconomic instability and delayed fiscal and 
exchange-rate adjustments.”  
 
Building on these basic elements from Rodrik, I have constructed a slightly more formal 
modelling framework. Initially, I make the following assumptions: 
M1) K > 0, ∆  > 0 
M2) Agents are risk neutral. 
M3) There are two groups. Group A faces a choice whether to fight or cooperate. Group B will 
always choose to cooperate. 
M4) When choosing to fight, a group’s probability to succeed in keeping its original endowment 
is given by p. 0 < p < 1. 
M5) If a fight is unsuccessful, the costs ∆  and K are split between the two groups. 
M6) The quality of the institutions of conflict management is given by the parameter I.  
M7) p=p(I), p’(I) < 0 . This function simply specifies that poorer quality institutions are less 
resistant to groups that seek to grab resources.   
 
 
Successful fight, p Failed fight, 1-p 
Cooperate ½ (1- ∆ ) ½ (1- ∆ ) 
Fight ½ ½(1 - ∆  - K) 
Table 6.1 Resource allocation between groups after external shock   
 
With the onset of an external shock within this framework, Group A must decide whether to 
cooperate or fight. The payoffs from cooperation ( Cpi ) and fighting ( Fpi ) are illustrated in table 
6.1. Choosing to cooperate means with certainty getting a payoff of Cpi = ½ (1- ∆ ). With a risk 
neutral agent, fighting will with a p probability of success yield an expected payoff of  
 
(E6.1) ( ) ( )KIpIpF −∆−−+= 1)(1)( 2121pi  
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The group will chose to fight if and only if Fpi > Cpi . This latter expression can be solved with 
respect to p to yield the following, with the right and left hand sides indicating the payoffs from 
fighting and cooperating, respectively: 
 
(E6.2) 
K
KpCF
+∆
>⇔> pipi
 
 
This is illustrated graphically in figure 6.1 with p on the horizontal axis and payoffs ( CF pipi , ) on 
the vertical axis. Cpi  is independent of p and is therefore shown as a horizontal line. Fpi increases 
in p as indicated by the solid line. For values of p below p*, cooperation is the preferred solution. 
For values of p above p*, the group will choose to fight. All else equal, an increase in K will tilt 
the Fpi -line down as indicated by the dotted line, and make fighting less likely. An increase in the 
loss due to external shock ( ∆ ) will both shift the Cpi -line down and tilt down the Fpi -line. 
Algebraically, it can be shown that the effect on Cpi is strongest, making fighting more likely.  
 
 
 
Figure 6.2: Fighting will only occur if institutions of conflict management are sufficiently weak. 
 
 
p
pi
*p0 1
Fpi
Cpi
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The crucial point in the model is that the fighting will be a preferred solution only if the 
institutional environment is sufficiently weak – p decreases with the strength of conflict 
management capacity. Formally, this can be seen by taking the derivative of Fpi with respect to I.  
 
(E6.3) ( ) 0)(' 21 <∆+= KIpdI
d Fpi
 
 
When the institutional quality increases, fighting with success becomes less likely. Because the 
expected payoff falls, agents will choose to cooperate and thus prevent costly social conflict. In 
this sense, conflict management institutions derive their strength from being able to moderate 
potential inequalities that arise from asymmetric claims to resources.  
 
I will now look more closely at assumption M3. In many cases, it is quite realistic to assume that 
agents have asymmetric bargaining power in the sense that only one group is able to fight and 
grab a disproportionate share of resources, whereas the other group lacks such an option. A 
strong ruling elite could be one such example, where the role of the other group could be 
captured by K, the costs (or price) of fighting if for instance social unrest breaks out. However, it 
would also be possible to replace M3 with the assumption that the two groups are symmetric and 
each faces the identical choice of whether to cooperate or fight. With this new assumption, 
payoffs could then be modelled by the game matrix in table 6.2. 
 
  Group A 
  Cooperate Fight 
1
2 (1− ∆)  p( 12) + (1− p)( 12)(1− ∆ − K)  
Co
o
p-
er
at
e 
1
2 (1− ∆)  p( 12 − ∆ − K) + (1− p)( 12)(1− ∆ − K) 
p( 12 − ∆ − K) + (1− p)( 12)(1− ∆ − K) 12 (1− ∆ − K) Gr
o
u
p 
B 
Fi
gh
t 
p( 12) + (1− p)( 12)(1− ∆ − K)  12 (1− ∆ − K) 
Table 6.2: A game matrix when players are symmetric. The top line in each quadrant indicates payoff to group A, 
and the bottom line represents the payoff to player B. 
 
As long as the condition set forth in E6.2 holds, then the framework is transformed into a 
prisoner’s dilemma game. In a one-shot version, the bottom right quadrant represents the only 
equilibrium solution because fighting is a dominant strategy for both players – each group will 
choose to fight irrespective of what the other group does. Only when strong institutions of 
conflict management sufficiently lower the potential return to non-cooperative behaviour by 
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making p < p*, will cooperative behaviour become an equilibrium solution and E6.2 would no 
longer hold.  
 
Another scenario is to keep the condition in E6.2, looking at an iterated version of the prisoner’s 
dilemma game. If the game was repeated n times, in particular with perfect information in the 
sense that players could coordinate before the game, there are theoretical strategies that could 
induce cooperative behaviour in all games except the last. However, the equilibrium is fragile and 
the final nth game would be no different from the one-shot game. Looking beyond the model to 
the present context, however, the social groups do not know how many external shocks that 
would hit the economy. The players therefore have incentives to play the game as a one-shot 
game. Furthermore, it can be argued that all cooperative strategies would need an institutional 
anchor to be successful. In sum, good institutions of conflict management are needed to avoid 
grabbing behaviour for both symmetric and asymmetric groups.18 In the words of Rodrik (1998b, 
13): 
When conflict-management institutions are sufficiently strong, opportunistic behavior is not rewarded ex 
post, and therefore expectations about the other group’s strategy have no bearing on the optimal choice. 
Cooperative behavior is the dominant strategy for each group. On the other hand, when conflict 
management institutions are extremely weak, there are large returns to opportunistic behaviour, and this can 
make fighting the dominant strategy irrespective of what the other group chooses to do.  
 
The upshot from this model is that strong conflict-management institutions can prevent 
opportunistic behaviour from certain groups aimed a grabbing a disproportionate share of 
resources. In itself, this keeps the available pie from shrinking further. Rodrik (1999a, 393) 
further argues that it can be particularly difficult to coordinate a “fair” distribution of resources in 
highly polarised societies. An interesting feature of the model is that this mechanism can be at 
work even with external positive shocks. If the social cost of non-cooperation (K) is large relative 
to the shock (- ∆ ), the economy may actually suffer a net loss from the external windfall (see 
Tornell and Lane 1999).  
 
                                                 
18
 Also M5 of the assumptions above may also be relaxed. With the specified payoffs and asymmetric players, 
fighting gives a larger share of a smaller pie to the “winner” whereas the “loser” gets whatever is left. However, one 
can also imagine a different division of this smaller pie to the “winner” and “loser”, or even a more continuous pool 
of outcomes where there are no clear-cut victors of the game. The only minimum criterion to drive the model is that 
one group believes its expected payoff from fighting is larger than from cooperating. Relaxing the assumption would 
require a more complex setup, but the conclusions from the framework would nevertheless hold. 
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6.2 An extension on the high costs of uncertainty 
A brief extension adapted from Rodrik (1991) can serve to illustrate exactly why the costs (K) 
associated with the non-cooperative solution can be very large. According to the above model, 
poor institutions of conflict management are likely to mean that the required policy response to a 
shock is misplaced, postponed or lacks popular support. There is uncertainty about the ability of 
government to enact proper macroeconomic policies. Consider this from the point of a private 
investor who can place available funds either in the domestic or foreign sector. There is a basic 
dilemma. On the one hand, the domestic economy depends on new investment to stimulate the 
economy, restore the macroeconomic capacities of government and create new growth. On the 
other hand, uncertainty about reform effectiveness give rational grounds for withholding the 
investment until the shock has been properly managed. For a risk neutral agent, the expected 
payoff (R) to an investment (F) placed domestically can be captured by the following expression. 
 
 (E6.4) 
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Here, α  represents the probability that government will not be able to undertake the appropriate 
policy response in the time perspective of the investment. λ  is a term that can represent either the 
costs of withdrawing the investment, reduced return or possibly sunk costs. r is the normal 
domestic rate of return. This means that the first term represents the payoff to an investor if 
reform fails, whereas the last term is payoff if reform succeeds. The opportunity cost (R*) is 
given by the return to the same investment (F) placed abroad. 
 
(E6.5) FrR *)1(* +=  
 
Here, r* represents the foreign interest rate. For any investment to take place domestically, the 
expected return must exceed or equal the opportunity cost (R ≥  R*). Differentiating E6.4 shows 
that the domestic investment level will, ceteris paribus, fall for increasing values of α : 
 
(E6.6) ( ) 0<−−= rF
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α
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For givens level of r*, α  and λ , the minimal domestic rate of return (r) necessary to attract an 
investment will then be given by:  
 
(E6.7) 
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Furthermore, this implies that uncertainty creates an implicit tax (t) on domestic investments, 
even when agents are risk neutral. That can be expressed by:  
 
(E6.8) 
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For a telling illustration of the potential level of this tax rate, let me make the relatively realistic 
assumption that the foreign rate of return (r*) is 5 %, and the sunk costs associated with domestic 
investments ( λ ) is 30%. In table 6.3 values for r and t are calculated for different levels of α . 
 
 (alfa) r t 
0 % 5 % 0 % 
10 % 9 % 44 % 
20 % 14 % 64 % 
30 % 20 % 75 % 
50 % 40 % 88 % 
Table 6.3 Implicit tax on investments under uncertainty 
 
To sum up, this simple extension shows that the implicit tax rate of even small levels of policy 
uncertainty can be substantial. This illustrates that potential costs (K) following an external 
shock, when poorly developed institutions of conflict management, can be large. 
 
6.3 Trade openness increases exposure to external shocks 
Making these results relevant to the interaction between openness and institutions is now only a 
matter of one step: linking increased foreign trade with exposure external shocks. In the 
literature, it is commonly assumed that more openness will make an economy more vulnerable to 
external shocks (Rodrik 1998, Kose and Prasad 2002).  
 
On the one hand, two intuitive theoretical arguments can be made to support this assumption. 
First, more trade openness increases the fraction of producers exposed to international 
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competition and the share of imports in consumption. It is therefore a straightforward implication 
that a larger trade share (more openness) means that the effect of an external shock will be 
broader and deeper. Second, openness is often associated with specialisation. A less diversified 
economy may be more vulnerable to asymmetric external shocks that only affect certain sectors.  
 
On the other hand, it is theoretically possible that external risk can counteract exposure to 
domestic risk sources and thereby reduce aggregate risk. First, access to larger international 
markets provides better stability for income and prices if country-specific shocks are lessened by 
the international opening of the economy. Second, access to international financial markets is in 
the literature often seen to have a role in mitigating external shocks. By placing money abroad, 
economic agents can in principle hedge against asymmetric shocks and thereby smooth out 
consumption patterns at home. In this arrangement, a group of countries that react differently to 
external shocks share the risks associated with openness. This second argument may be less valid 
in practice, because such arrangements involve significant transaction costs for individual 
households. Furthermore, institutional investors are found to exhibit a bias for domestic 
investments that prevents extensive risk sharing.19 
 
In sum, theory has mixed predictions on the effect of trade exposure on shocks in an economy. 
Nevertheless, empirical studies generally find support for a linkage between openness and risk 
exposure. Rodrik (1998) points to a robust, empirical linkage between openness and the size of 
governments. He argues that increased government spending appears to provide social insurance 
in open economies, and finds empirical support for the claim. Underlying this key argument is a 
positive correlation between trade openness and exposure to external shocks. McCarthy and 
Dhareshwar (1992) seek to explain why external shocks affect some economies more severely 
than others. A key finding is that “the size and various components of the shock depends on such 
factors as [a country’s] degree of openness, export/import composition” (ibid, 42). Rodrik (1997, 
57) furthermore undertakes an empirical analysis indicating that increased external risk exposure 
also gives an increase in aggregate risk: “The results show that the three measures of income risk, 
as well as consumption risk, increase with exposure to external risk. This finding is robust to the 
inclusion of a wide range of additional controls.” 
 
                                                 
19
 In the financial literature, this is known as the ”home bias puzzle”. 
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Economies with an export concentration in commodities may particularly be susceptible to 
external shocks. An IMF study (Cashin and McDermott 2001, 25) has found that commodity 
prices are highly volatile and increasingly so after 1973: “Rapid, unexpected and often large 
movements in commodity prices are an important feature of the behavior of commodity prices. 
Such movements can have serious consequences for the terms of trade, real incomes and fiscal 
position of commodity-dependent countries, and have profound implications for the achievement 
of macroeconomic stabilization”. The study argues that the findings are of particular relevance to 
developing countries, many of whom depend on one or two commodities for their main export 
earnings. When combined with the oil crisis in the 70s and the debt crisis in the 80s, the overall 
picture seems to indicate that external shocks have been an important characteristic of the world 
economy in the last decades. In sum, it does not seem unreasonable to assume that more open 
economies are more exposed to external shocks and aggregate risk.  
 
6.4 Summing up the theory 
In this chapter, I have developed an argument in three steps for why there may be an interaction 
effect between openness and institutions. First, the Rodrik framework illustrates that strong 
institutions of conflict management are needed to adequately deal with external shocks. Second, 
external shocks can unleash social conflict that creates an uncertainty detrimental to economic 
growth. Third, more open economies are assumed to experience greater exposure to external 
shocks. Taken together, these stylized presumptions seem to indicate that sufficiently good 
institutions are required to reap the growth benefits of economic openness. As such, there is an a 
priori rationale for the working hypothesis of this paper: that the growth benefits of openness 
vary with the institutional environment. Rodrik (1999b, 14) also draws attention to these 
complementarities between openness and sound institutions of conflict management:  
Openness will leave countries vulnerable to external shocks that can trigger domestic conflicts and political 
upheavals. These consequences are damaging not only in their own right, but also serve to prolong and 
magnify the effects of external shocks. The developing world has been buffeted by a series of external 
shocks since the 1970s […] [and shocks] will always be part of the global landscape. […] Therefore, the 
ability to manage turbulence in the world economy is critical component of a strategy of making openness 
work. 
 
The reverse side of this coin is that openness may have adverse effects on income if institutional 
development is sufficiently low. Unless a strategy for outward orientation also works towards 
strengthening the capacity for conflict management, it may not be successful in fostering growth. 
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A situation where decisions must be made to satisfy some optimal criterion (free trade) when 
others cannot be satisfied (institutions) is called a second-best optimum after the general theory 
launched by Lipsey and Lancaster (1956). When one first-best optimum condition cannot be met 
for one reason or another, they argue that it would require an individual investigation case by 
case whether it in welfare terms would be beneficial to satisfy further optimum conditions. 
 
6.5 Competing theories 
In the above framework, good institutions of conflict management are needed to offset the 
external shocks that follow from increased trade openness. But institutions and openness may 
also interact through other channels, and depending on the sign of the interaction variable may 
thus work to either strengthen or offset the effect outlined above. Activist industrial, trade and 
technological (ITT) policies may be one alternative channel, and this competing interaction 
theory will be outlined in the following.  
 
Multiple schools of thought have advocated development strategies for industrialisation that 
include active state intervention in the economy. Theoretical basis for such policies can for 
instance be found in the infant industry argument, the Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) idea of a big 
push, or in Prebish’s (1959) theory that the income elasticity of demand for primary commodities 
is lower than for industrial products. Chang (2002) documents how the now industrialised 
countries relied on a range of interventionist measures to bring their economies to the level of 
technological sophistication that characterised the richest states at the time. These measures 
included industrial subsidies, public investment programmes, tariffs and quotas, active support 
for the acquisition of foreign technology and various forms of public-private cooperation. 
Measures to lower trade openness are usually a part of such a policy cocktail, although 
safeguarding against foreign competition in principle can be achieved by other means. A main 
criticism against activist ITT policies has been that entrepreneurs are given incentives to maintain 
privileges rather than invest in productive activities. Inefficient firms privileged by ITT policies 
run the risk of becoming a sustained drain on consumers and governments budgets. To prevent a 
rent-seeking equilibrium, government must provide predictable and time-consistent incentives. 
This is a demanding task and activist ITT policies are commonly said to require a strong 
institutional framework. In the literature, good institutions are commonly associated with low 
levels of corruption. Well-intended efforts at promoting industrialisation or favouring certain 
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growth-promoting sectors may turn sour if government is unable to withstand rent-seeking 
pressures from private interest groups. Strong institutions are therefore required to reap the gains 
from ITT policies.  
 
This line of reasoning can consequently indicate a negative interaction effect between openness 
and institutions: activist ITT policies (less openness) and good institutions can work together to 
promote growth. This effect depends critically on two criteria. First, the activist policies must 
actually be more effective in enhancing growth than a laissez-faire approach. Second, protective 
trade measures that lower the level of openness must be an integrated part of these policies. The 
first question is long-standing without scholarly consensus, whereas the second aspect depends 
on the specific ITT policies put in place. Nevertheless, the negative interaction effect from ITT 
policies and institutions depends crucially on both of these criteria being fulfilled. 
 
I have now identified two possible interaction effects between institutions and trade openness that 
point in opposite directions. In testing empirically for interaction effects in the next chapter, it is a 
methodologically complicated task – if at all possible – to separate the two effects. In practice, 
the effects can cancel each other or one may dominate the other. There may be grounds for 
arguing that the negative interaction effect (ITT policies and institutions) must meet more 
demanding criteria than the positive interaction effect (openness and external shocks). As such, 
the net interaction effect is likely to be negative. Nevertheless, the outcome is not given a priori 
and must be determined empirically.  
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7. Empirical testing: Is there an interaction effect between openness 
and institutions? 
In this chapter, I want to undertake an empirical investigation of my hypothesis that trade is a 
better growth promoting policy tool in a strong institutional environment that in an environment 
with poorly developed institutions. The basic methodology I will follow is to regress economic 
growth on a set of variables that includes indicators of trade openness and institutions.20 The last 
10-15 years, there has been a strong growth in research papers that use this approach to find 
linkages between economic growth and openness. There are thus many researches who have set a 
framework for empirical investigations of this type.  
 
7.1 Theoretical framework for growth regressions 
The aim of regression analysis is to explain variation in a dependent variable by a set of 
independent variables. In the specification of an econometric model, an error term is included to 
capture the variation in the dependent variable that cannot be explained by independent variables. 
In standard ordinary least square regressions (OLS), some assumptions are commonly made (Hill 
et al. 2001, Kennedy 2003):  
A1) The expected value of the disturbance term is zero. 
A2) Disturbances have uniform variance and are uncorrelated. 
A3) The independent variables are exogenous and fixed in repeated samples. 
A4) There is no exact linear relationship between any of the independent variables and there are 
more observations than independent variables. 
A5) The error term is normally distributed. 
 
When all of these assumptions are satisfied, our estimators will not only be unbiased but also 
BLUE - best linear unbiased estimators. The requirements set out in A1-A5 are strict and in 
practical econometric work, where optimal solutions are not always available, research design 
often will have to resort to a best possible-criterion. Accuracy of data will have to be weighed 
against the need to increase the number of observations, methodology must be workable yet meet 
scientific standards. This is especially true in cross-country growth regressions, where the 
                                                 
20
 Analyses will be undertaken using Stata 7.0. The dataset and accompanying command files are available upon 
request. 
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number of observations is limited. In the empirical part of this paper, I will use OLS as a starting 
point and subsequently analyse the error terms to test whether the assumptions A1-A5 are 
fulfilled. Based on that, I can point out potential weaknesses in my results and possibly take 
measures to improve my regressions.  
 
The dependent variable is economic growth and the regression will try to identify factors that can 
explain why growth varies across countries. There is a vast literature that employs this 
methodology to look at a broad range of issues, and the technique is often identified with Robert 
J. Barro. There is no theoretical consensus framework to guide empirical work on growth, argue 
Levine and Renelt (1992), who also present a recognised evaluation of the effectiveness and 
reliability of cross-country growth regressions in general. They assert that the lack of 
methodological consensus has led to eclecticism in the sense that researchers often highlight the 
particular variables relevant for the question they are investigating, while failing to control for 
other factors analysed by other papers. This eclecticism may undermine the econometric 
soundness of research results, particularly since Levine and Renelt (1992, 943) claim that “almost 
all identified relationships are very sensitive to slight alterations in the conditioning set of 
variables, and many publicized coefficients change sign with small changes in the conditioning 
set of variables”. The article goes on to analyse the robustness of econometric results using the 
specification: 
 
(E7.1) uZMIY zmi +++= βββ  
  
Here, Y indicates the annual per capita GDP growth rate, I is a vector of variables always 
included in the regressions, M is the particular variable of interest and Z is a subset of a broader 
pool that in previous studies have been found to be correlated with growth. More than 50 factors 
are considered in total. To limit the effect of multicollinearity, they limit the number of variables 
in each specification to eight or fewer. The analysis gives support to their assertion about 
coefficient sensitivity and fragility of results, leading them to propose the following econometric 
maxim: “We consider the relationship between growth and a particular variable of interest to be 
robust if it remains statistically significant and of the theoretically predicted sign when the 
conditioning set of variables in the regression changes” (Levine and Renelt 1992, 943). In their 
analysis, the share of investment in GDP is the only factor that meets the strict criterion the 
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authors themselves put forward. While some researchers consider this maxim to be overly 
rigorous, arguing that statistical significance in many instances is enough to give valuable insight, 
Levine and Renelt provide an important mental note on the potential limitations of cross-country 
regressions.  
 
7.2 Data material and selection of variables 
The selection of data is crucial in any regression analysis. This section will therefore try to 
motivate and justify the choices I have made in compiling a dataset from various sources. As 
economic growth is the dependent variable, the selected time period and data will shape the rest 
of the analysis. Some of the most renowned papers on trade and economic growth, such as Sachs 
and Warner (1995), Edwards (1998) or Rodrik and Rodriguez (2001), use measures of economic 
growth that cover relatively long time periods (15-30 years). This is motivated by a desire to 
isolate the specific effects that trade has on economic growth, and isolate influence caused by 
other factors. Both business cycle effects and shocks that hit the world economy asymmetrically 
are assumed be smoothed out during this time span. More specifically related to trade, the time 
span is also viewed to neglect the mere level effects of for instance a one-shot trade liberalisation 
on GDP, as predicted by static trade theory, thus allowing for a cleaner focus on the effect of 
trade on long-term steady-state economic growth. Sachs and Warner (1995) look at the time 
period 1965-1990. Writing ten years later, I have chosen to select the time period 1975-2000. 
This is not only motivated by a desire to have more recent data, but also by data availability. In 
the World Development Indicators published by the World Bank (2004), the starting and closing 
years of the chosen period are watersheds: Before 1975, data is simply not available for many 
countries; after 2000, data for several countries have not yet been reported and made available. 
This gives a dataset of 94 countries, using PPP per capita data measured in 1995 international 
dollars (country list given as an appendix).  
 
A requirement for undertaking OLS regression analysis is that the conditioning variables – such 
as indicators of e.g. investment, trade and human capital – are independent of, or exogenous to, 
the dependent variable. Specifically, in this case, there should be no feedback from economic 
growth to any of the independent variables I include in my analysis. Unless this requirement is 
satisfied, assumption A3 is violated and the estimators will become biased. Thinking of examples 
where economic growth may give feedback to independent variables is rather straightforward: It 
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is for instance not unreasonable to think that a larger GDP can increase government resources 
that can be channelled into education, thus increasing human capital. One method to improve the 
exogeneity of the set of conditioning variables is to select data that in time precede the dependent 
variable growth period. Doing so, however, may compromise the relevance of our results. The 
investment rate, measured as a percentage of GDP, is for instance known to fluctuate. If it were 
significantly different in the middle of the growth period than in the years preceding it, that is 
likely to affect growth in towards the end of the period. If it has a significant effect on growth, 
then excluding the middle observation will imply that the investment coefficient becomes less 
representative of the actual effect of investments on growth. In selecting the data, one is therefore 
faced with a dilemma between data exogeneity and data relevance.  
 
In the empirical growth literature, there is no clear consensus as to how this dilemma should be 
resolved. However, there is a rationale in choosing pre-period values for variables that are not 
likely to exhibit unexpected changes in the period, nor likely to be directly affected by economic 
growth. For variables that do not fall within these two criteria, it is common to employ the period 
arithmetic average. The latter method also increases data availability, since the mean can be 
calculated without having values for all the years in question. I follow the selection principles of 
Sachs and Warner (1995). This implies that for instance life expectancy, population size and 
human capital indicators take pre-period values. On the other hand, variables such as 
investments, trade measures, and institutional indicators are averaged over the time period. The 
time selection of each variable will be shown by its name. 
 
Although Levine and Renelt argue that there is no consensus around a theoretical framework for 
growth regressions, they nevertheless point to a minimum set of variables that – based on 
economic theory and previous studies – commonly are included in the regressions. These 
variables constitute the I-vector they use as a base set of conditioning variables and include: 
investment share of GDP, initial GDP per capita to control for convergence,21 a human capital 
measure and population growth (ibid: 945). They argue that few studies use all of these variables, 
but most control for a subset. Sticking to this principle, and in accordance with the standard 
research tradition, I will also use a subset of these variables. The subset will be integrated into the 
                                                 
21
 It is worth noting that a negative coefficient for initial GDP is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for 
convergence. To establish convergence, there must also be a decrease over time in the standard deviation of growth 
rates (also known as sigma convergence).  
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conditioning variables when checking the robustness of the results. Because growth in GDP per 
capita is the dependent variable in my regression, a partial conditioning of population growth is 
already built into my analysis. However, population growth may in itself influence on per capita 
income. 
 
The data I employ comes from various sources. The two main sources are World Development 
Indicators from the World Bank (2004) and institutional time series data from the International 
Country Risk Guide, available from Political Risk Services (2005). Furthermore, I have 
employed a time series of tariff data available from Gwartney and Lawson (2005) at the Fraser 
Institute.22 For a detailed description of the dataset employed, including sources for each variable, 
readers are referred to the enclosed appendix. 
 
7.3 Indicators of openness 
There can be many determinants of trade: geography, resources, population, purchasing power 
and trade policy are only some of the factors that influence on the quantity of a particular 
country’s imports and exports. As economic researchers we are not only interested in  
understanding the interplay between trade and economic development in general, but also get the 
specific insights into how trade policy will influence the economy that will enable us to give 
specific advise on how to achieve economic growth. In an experimental world where all variables 
in the name of science smoothly adjust to authoritative commands, we would produce a set of 
economies that were identical in all respects except trade policy. In the scientifically imperfect 
world of the social sciences, however, isolating the effects of a single variable is a far more 
complicated affair. As my above overview of the existing literature on openness and growth has 
shown, endogeneity problems or omitted variable bias can be potential weaknesses.  
 
Pritchett (1996) surveys possible indicators of openness and categorizes them into incidence-
based or outcome-based indicators. The former is based on observed trade policy measures such 
as quotas and NTBs, whereas the latter tries to deduce levels of protection based on observed 
trade and price patterns. Both have strong and weak aspects. Broadly speaking, incidence-
                                                 
22
 The Fraser Institute is an independent Canadian economic, social research and educational foundation. It describes 
itself as dedicated to enhancing the quality of life by researching the role of competitive markets, lower taxes, and 
less regulation. It is a private non-profit foundation, financed by private contributions. The institute’s website is 
www.fraserinstitute.ca. 
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indicators have the advantage of being directly observable. However, protection can be imposed 
through such a myriad of restrictions (quotas, licensing, physiosanitary demands) and taxes 
(tariffs, administrative fees) that cross-national comparisons in practice are very difficult to make. 
Outcome-based indicators are more easily quantifiable, but are not directly and without 
qualification very informative about actual levels of protection in an economy. Pritchett analyses 
several different objective trade policy measures and finds that they are completely uncorrelated 
across countries. He therefore takes a rather pessimistic view on our ability to find a consistent 
and informative indicator of openness, particularly with respect to the least developed countries 
(LDCs). As I see it, this uncertainty has two main implications. First, it implies that researchers 
will have to settle for openness measures that are the best possible – but not necessarily optimal – 
and be correspondingly careful when interpreting results. Second, it gives a strong argument that 
an indicator cannot be rejected merely because some observations seem oddly classified. Indeed, 
Pritchett finds that all of the considered indicators gave controversial classifications to at least a 
few countries.  
 
In the following, I will try to find an operational indicator for openness based on these remarks 
and the suggestions in my literature review. I start with Dollar (1992), who used the deviations 
from U.S. prices on tradable goods as an openness measure, arguing that the law of one price 
would equalise price levels under free trade. However, as Rodrik and Rodriguez (2001) (RR) 
pointed out, several studies have demonstrated weak empirical support for the law of one price. 
The price deviations indicator is therefore no longer frequently employed. Ben-David’s (1993) 
work on convergence does not employ an openness indicator, and is as such not helpful in 
choosing one. 
 
Sachs and Warner (1995) (SW) have a very important point in arguing that the inward orientation 
of an economy can come from a number of sources: import restrictions in many forms, export 
restrictions and exchange rate instability. There is as such a solid rationale for their utilisation of 
an openness indicator that incorporates several of these sources. One difficulty with the 
dichotomous indicator SW employ is separating open economies from moderately closed 
economies: an economy that has an average tariff of 39 % and 39 % of trade covered by NTBs 
will be classified just as open as a country with completely free trade. However, the fundamental 
challenge with the SW indicator is that its strength derives mainly from factors that are linked to 
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macroeconomic mismanagement, which in itself has a detrimental effect on growth. It can 
therefore be difficult to distinguish the effects of trade policy proper. The RR critique and 
subsequent work of Wacziarg and Welch (2003) has led to a reinterpretation of the SW 
coefficient. A positive view would argue that the indicator represents a broad set of outward-
oriented policy measures in general, whereas a less optimistic view would see the measure 
merely indicating poor macroeconomic management. Both interpretations could prove useful in 
many circumstances. In this context, however, the focus is on the possible growth effects of trade 
policy. I therefore choose to search for a more precise indicator.  
 
Tariffs and quotas are generally considered to be the main instruments of trade policy. A direct 
openness indicator may be to use tariffs rates, or a measure of non-tariff barriers directly in the 
regression equation. Of the studies I reviewed above, only Edwards (1998) uses these direct 
measures of trade policy. The literature is divided as to how representative direct measures of 
trade policy are of the actual level of protection. Rodrik and Rodriguez (2001, 60) are strong 
advocates for using tariff averages or coverage ratios for NTBs because they are the most direct 
measures of trade policy available: “We know of no papers that document the existence of 
serious biases in these direct indicators, much less establish that an alternative indicator 
‘performs’ better (in the relevant sense of calibrating the restrictiveness of trade regimes).” On 
the other side, Dollar and Kraay (2003, 148-50) argue that direct indicators often are 
uninformative about actual trade policy, give country-specific examples and cite liberalisation 
episodes where indicator values remained largely unchanged. They also argue that tariff 
reductions are weakly linked to increased trade volumes. While these objections remain valid and 
may cause misclassification of some economies, Pritchett (1996) finds that all openness measures 
will cause misclassification of some outliers. An indicator cannot be rejected merely on such 
grounds alone.  
 
The next question then becomes which direct trade indicators that are most representative of 
actual protective levels. Dollar and Kraay (2003) raise an important point about NTB-measures 
that typically represent the fraction of tariff lines covered by some non-tariff restriction: The 
coverage ratio is not very revealing as to the nature, severity and the effect of the actual 
restrictions in place. As such, the tariff rates are more informative. Furthermore, time series data 
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are more complete for tariffs than NTBs.23 Tariff rates can either be reported by simple or 
weighted average. The former method risks giving influence to goods categories that are 
relatively unimportant for a country, whereas the latter method overlooks the potential effects of 
prohibitive tariffs.  
 
In sum, I find that these considerations support using the tariff rate as a measure of openness. I 
will further use a simple, unweighted average since that gives better time series data coverage. 
The tariff times series data compiled as an index by the Frasier Institute are based on data from 
the annually published World Development Reports.24 A first look at how this index indicator 
correlates with growth is found in figure 7.1, generated from the data I have compiled. Tariff 
rates are indicated by an index that ranges from 0 to 10. Higher index values indicate higher 
tariffs, having a negative impact on growth.  
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Figure 7.1: Growth and tariff rates 
 
7.4 Institutional indicators 
As discussed in chapter 5, the most common method of quantitatively assessing institutional 
performance is to use governance indicators or indices. Some rely fully or in part on subjective 
                                                 
23
 Barro and Lee (1994) provide NTB data for around 60 of the countries included in my analysis, but only a single 
point observation dated between 1985 and 1989. 
24
 The index is based on the World Development Indicator labelled “simple mean tariff” (personal correspondence 
with author Robert A. Lawson). The World Development Indicators (2004, 325) defines this variable as “the 
unweighted average of effectively applied rates or most favoured nation rates for all products subject to tariffs 
calculated on all traded goods”. 
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ratings developed by scholars, investors, or officials while others integrate more objective 
measures such as the official murder rate to proxy for institutional quality. The range of 
institutional aspects considered is wide and may for instance include the rule of law, quality of 
bureaucracy, democratic participation, trust in political leaders, corruption, internal and external 
conflict. In the quantitative literature, studies include multiple aspects either in separate control 
variables or combined as an integrated institutional measure.  
 
A World Bank (2005) paper25 surveys existing institutional indicators, trying to asses how they 
differ with respect to aspects considered, specificity, data coverage across countries and time, 
method, data quality and accuracy, and the use of data in published studies. The study argues that 
indicators are likely to differ sizeably with respect to quality and accuracy, and therefore points to 
some principles in choosing indicators. First, aggregating several aspects in a joint indicator is 
likely to improve quality. Second, accuracy may increase with the number of respondents who 
contribute. Third, indicators are seen to be more reliable if it is marketed since paying subscribers 
give incentives for accuracy. Fourth, strong interests or ideology on the part of the publishers 
may weaken reliability. Fifth, indicators that have been available for long periods or used in 
published research papers are seen to be more accurate, because they have been challenged and 
improved over time.  
 
Based on an overall assessment, I have chosen the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 
from Political Risk Services (2005) as my institutional indicator. The ICRG is based on an 
aggregate of several measures, available only to paying subscribers, published by a consultancy 
firm for use by multinational firms and has been available for over two decades. However, 
relatively few experts are involved in rating. It therefore meets four of the five criteria outlined 
above. Two additional factors were decisive for my choice. Being one of the longest time series 
available, the ICRG is has very good availability across countries and time periods. Also, among 
the 13 surveyed indicators, the ICRG is one of only two that get the top score for use in published 
studies.26 In sum, I consider the ICRG to my best available option. 
 
                                                 
25
 The survey is available online and seems to originally have been written in 2001. It has been updated at least twice 
since then, most recently in 2005.  
26
 The Freedom House democracy index gets the other top score, but is less relevant in my context because it 
exclusively focuses on democratic participation. The ICRG in addition to democracy includes measures of 
government quality.  
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The ICRG was created in 1980 by the editors of the weekly newsletter International Reports, but 
is now published by a private consultancy called the PRS Group. The rating published rating 
comprises of 22 variables in three subcategories: political, financial, and economic risk. The 
governance indicators are found in the political risk section, and contain 12 components that are 
weighted to form a maximum total score of 100 points, where more points indicate better 
governance. ICRG (2005) describe the scores as being assigned on a subjective, but consistent 
basis along specific criteria more closely described in the guide that accompanies the data. The 
ICRG guide underlines that the framework permits a flexible approach to rating governance: 
“One advantage of the ICRG model is that it allows users to make their own risk assessments 
based on the ICRG model or to modify the model to meet their specific requirements. […] 
Composite risk ratings can be recalculated by giving greater weight to those [requirements].” 
(Political Risk Services 2005, 27). 
 
I have chosen to take advantage of the flexibility inherent in the ICRG framework by selecting 
the components that are the most relevant in estimating the institutions of conflict management. 
These include internal conflict, religion in politics, ethnic tensions, democratic accountability, 
quality of bureaucracy and account for 34% of the full ICRG index. Governance factors that are 
more peripheral to the theory I am trying to test, such as for instance investment profile and 
military in politics, are thus not included. The score on the relevant characteristics is then 
recalculated to a scale ranging from 0 to 10 – where higher values indicate better institutions – 
that will be included as my institutional measure in the empirical analysis below.  
 
7.5 Openness, institutions and growth – an analysis 
I have already shown that trade barriers as measured by the average tariff rate have a significant 
and substantially negative effect on growth. The question I will address in this section is whether 
trade barriers have different effects on growth in countries with a good institutional environment 
versus countries with poorly developed institutions. To analyse this proposition, I introduce an 
interaction variable that I define as follows: 
 
(E7.2) iii TARIFFNINSTITUTIONINTERACTIO 7500*8400=  
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Subsequently, regressions are undertaken. Since Levine and Renelt (1992) find investments to be 
the most robust variable affecting growth, LNINV7500 is controlled for in all the regressions. I 
then subsequently add the institutional indicator INSTITUTION8400 in regression two (R2) and 
the interaction variable INTERACTION in R3. In R4 and R5, the most standard controls (Levine 
and Renelt’s I-vector) are introduced by adding LGDP75 for convergence and LNLIFE75 as a 
measure of human capital. In R6-R8, continental dummies are introduced. The results are 
reported in table 7.1.  
 
 R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 
LNINV7500 5.12*** 
(0.72) 
4.62*** 
(0.69) 
4.73*** 
(0.68) 
4.54*** 
(0.66) 
2.90*** 
(0.62) 
2.61*** 
(0.63) 
2.63*** 
(0.62) 
2.40*** 
(0.64) 
TARIFF7500 -0.23 
(0.08) 
0.16* 
(0.09) 
0.71** 
(0.35) 
0.63* 
(0.34) 
0.48* 
(0.28) 
0.35 
(0.29) 
0.29 
(0.29) 
0.34 
(0.28) 
INSTITUTION  0.42*** 
(0.12) 
0.66*** 
(0.18) 
0.91*** 
(0.20) 
0.64*** 
(0.17) 
0.69*** 
(0.17) 
0.47** 
(0.18) 
0.68*** 
(0.17) 
INTERACTION   -0.09* 
(0.05) 
-0.09* 
(0.05) 
-0.09** 
(0.04) 
-0.07* 
(0.04) 
-0.05 
(0.04) 
-0.06 
(0,04) 
LGDP75    -0.73*** 
(0.25) 
-1.74*** 
(0.27) 
-1.83*** 
(0.27) 
-1.71*** 
(0.27) 
-1.68*** 
(0.27) 
LNLIFE75     8.43*** 
(1.39) 
6.44*** 
(1.70) 
9.35*** 
(1.42) 
7.89*** 
(1.37) 
SSAFRICA      -1.07** 
(0.54) 
  
LATINAM       -0.82** 
(0.36) 
 
ASIA        0.88** 
(0.36) 
         
N 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
Adjusted R2 0.36 0.44 0.45 0.49 0.64 0.65 0.65 0.66 
Table 7.1. Regression results with standard errors reported  in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 
respectively 10, 5 and 1 percent levels. GROWTH7500 is the dependent variable. 
 
 TARIFF7500 INSTITUTION8400 INTERACTION 
TARIFF500 1   
INSTITUTION8400 -0.57 1  
INTERACTION 0.91 -0.26 1 
Table 7.2: Correlation matrix for selected variables 
 
In brief, the results show that the INTERACTION effect does enter significantly and that the 
implication of TARIFF7500 varies with the institutional environment: high tariffs only reduce 
growth if institutions are well developed. The specific implications will be spelled out in greater 
detail below, but first some comments on the specific regressions are in order. Going from R1 to 
R2 changes the sign of TARIFF7500, indicating that R1 suffers from omitted variable bias 
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because of the exclusion of a variable that is negatively correlated with the tariff level. 
INSTITUTION8400 has indeed such a negative correlation, as table 7.2 shows. R2 arguably 
atones for some of the bias, but the coefficient is still not significant. When the INTERACTION 
variable is added in R3, however, TARIFF7500 enters significantly at the 5 % level with a boost 
in the coefficient value. The INTERACTION variable also enters significantly, with an even 
higher absolute value. The inclusion of the interaction variable both improves the significance 
and the fit of the specification. Although TARIFF7500 on average has a negative effect on 
growth, it does seem that the variable’s effect is mediated by the institutional environment. 
Although both TARIFF7500 and INTERACTION keep signs and magnitudes in R6-R8, neither 
is completely robust to the inclusion of continental dummies.  
 
If these results are representative, they imply that the effect of openness depends largely on the 
institutional quality of each country. Keeping all other factors constant, I will now consider some 
of the specific implications by looking at the effect a change in openness will have on growth. An 
expression for the marginal effect of a unit increase in the tariff index for each observation can be 
found by taking the derivative of GROWTH7500 with respect to TARIFF7500, and inserting the 
fitted coefficients from R5: 
 
(E7.3) i
i
i NINSTITUTIO
dTARIFF
dGROWTH 7500*09.048.0
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Figure 7.2: When the tariff level is raised by a unit increase in the TARIFF7500 index value, the effect on growth 
will depend on the level of institutional development.  
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In equation E7.3, a marginal change in openness will ceteris paribus have no effect on growth 
when INSTITUTION8400 is at 5.33. Above that threshold of institutional development, openness 
will have a positive effect on growth. If equation E7.3 is taken literally it implies that below the 
specified level, tariffs have a negative effect on growth. This effect is illustrated in figure 7.2. 
 
In my sample of 94 countries, only 25 have a level of institutional development where a tariff 
increase has a positive effect on growth. For the remaining 69 observations, tariffs have a 
negative impact on growth. These results are illustrated by the histogram figure 7.3. The 
distribution is skewed to the right, and there is a peak at the bottom for the set of ten countries 
with the least developed institutions.  
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Figure 7.3: Based on regression R5, the histogram illustrates the marginal effects of a unit increase TARIFF7500 on 
growth for a sample of 94 countries. The spread is due to cross-country differences in institutional quality. 
 
7.6 Robustness checks 
The robustness of these results can be checked by several means. The first is to perform standard 
analysis of the error terms to verify that none of the assumptions A1-A5 of OLS analysis are 
violated, as is done in an appendix to this paper. This analysis indicates that OLS gives an 
appropriate estimator in the specified regressions. A second robustness test would be to look 
more closely at the variables used. The choice of tariffs indicator is of particular interest due to 
the ongoing discussion in the literature on how trade openness best should be measured. As this 
was a main objection raised by Dollar and Kraay (2003), I would argue that the most relevant test 
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of an openness variable would be to check if it correctly predicts trade flows. That could be done 
by the following regression specification: 
 
(E7.4) iiii ZTARIFFTRADESHARE ετττ +++= 75007500 10  
 
Z represents a vector of control variables. Theory suggests that country size (measured by 
population), income level, growth rate, and continental dummies to control for qualitative factors 
should be included in the list of controls. For the independent variables, in parallel to the growth 
regression above, there is a dilemma between endogeneity and relevance. Here relevance is given 
weight, because it is not unreasonable that the trade share would reflect changes in the 
independent variables within a relatively short period of time. The regression results are indicated 
in table 7.4: 
 
 R9 R10 R11 R12 R13 
TARIFF7500 -6.48*** 
(1.75) 
-5.44*** 
(1.82) 
-7.04*** 
(2.37) 
-5.55** 
(2.26) 
-4.90** 
(2.45) 
POPULATION75 
 
 -0.06* 
(0.03) 
-0.06* 
(0.03) 
-0.11*** 
(0.03) 
-0.12*** 
(0.04) 
LGDP75   -5.03 
(4.83) 
-5.76 
(4.53) 
-1.54 
(6.38) 
GROWTH7500    6.72*** 
(1.83) 
7.18*** 
(2.27) 
SSAFRICA     12.6 
(16.2) 
LATINAMERICA     2.17 
(11.29) 
ASIA     14.13 
(11.4) 
      
N 93 93 93 93 93 
Adjusted R2 0.12 0.14 0.14 0.25 0.24 
Table 7.4 Regression results with standard errors reported  in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 
respectively 10, 5 and 1 percent levels. TRADESH7500 is the dependent variable. 
 
The results show that the tariffs enter with a strong and statistically significant impact, regardless 
of the list of controls. These results seem to indicate that tariffs are a satisfactory and relevant 
measure of trade openness.  
 
Not withstanding or denying the relevance of tariffs as a measure of openness, results could be 
made even more robust if multiple measures of openness were included in the analysis. An 
instrumental variable for the trade share in GDP, using Frankel and Romer’s (1999) approach in 
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constructing a geography-based gravity model, is one possible candidate. Data for NTB-coverage 
is another. The raw material for these measures is to some extent available, but I consider the 
work required to construct end-indicators to be beyond the scope of this paper. Furthermore, it 
would also be desirable to use multiple institutional indicators. These are more readily available, 
but with N openness measures and M institutional indicators, there are in principle M*N possible 
interaction variables that can be employed. While I would find such contributions very 
interesting, they are again arguably beyond the scope of my analysis. The spirit of this paper is 
not to provide an exhaustive empirical analysis of the hypothesis at hand, but rather attempt to 
establish some linkages that may be overlooked in the present empirical literature.  
 
Another possible caveat is determining the exact cause of the interaction effect between 
institutions and openness that is revealed in the analysis. The present hypothesis argues that good 
institutions of conflict management are needed to effectively respond to the external shocks that 
follow from openness. But there are competing theories, as discussed in chapter 6. One such 
theory is that good institutions enable countries to use activist tariff policy to promote an 
industrial development that enhances growth. The interaction effect between openness and 
institutions would then be negative. The empirical analysis finds a positive interaction effect, and 
therefore does not support the latter theory.27 Instead, the results lend support to the main 
hypothesis in this paper, putting emphasis on the institutional capacity to act in response to 
external shocks. This could be taken to indicate that good institutions of conflict management at 
least are more important for open economies than those with protectionist policies. Nevertheless, 
the analysis undertaken has not provided a framework to determine the exact channel of the 
interaction effect. My hypothesis proposes that capacity to respond to external shocks accounts 
for the interaction effect, but the web of causality is complex and I cannot exclude the possibility 
that it has a different origin. Empirical results do not necessarily map into unique theoretical 
forms, and further research is needed to fully understand the interplay between openness, 
institutions and growth.  
                                                 
27
 On the other hand, the alternative theory cannot be outtright rejected because the institutions that foster conflict 
management may not be the same institutions that promote well-functioning protectionist policies. Only institutions 
of conflict management are integrated in the empirical analysis. 
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8. Conclusion 
This paper has sought to investigate the relationship between economic openness, institutions and 
growth. Specifically, my working hypothesis has been that good institutions of conflict 
management are necessary to reap the full growth benefits of openness. Chapter 3 shows that 
existing trade and growth models have ambiguous theoretical predictions for the effect of 
openness on growth, implying that the relationship ultimately must be determined empirically. 
The empirical literature is surveyed in chapter 4, and shows that a clear and robust connection 
between openness and growth has yet to be established. Although most studies find a positive 
relationship on average, there is considerable unexplained variation in the data. In chapter 6, I 
proposed that some of the heterogeneity may be explained by considering a country’s institutions 
of conflict management. Assuming that openness is accompanied by an increased exposure to 
external shocks that can spur domestic conflict, I developed a model proposing a positive 
interaction effect between openness and institutions: Strong institutions of conflict management 
means that countries can adjust adequately to shocks and benefit from openness; weak 
institutions that fail to respond can stifle growth and generate further long-term losses for the 
economy.  
 
In chapter 7, I proposed using tariff rates and selected components of the ICRG index as 
operational definitions of openness and institutions of conflict management, respectively. The 
empirical analysis found a positive and statistically significant interaction effect between 
openness (low tariffs) and institutions. In fact, the results indicate that for the 25 countries in the 
sample with the poorest institutions, a ceteris paribus lowering of tariffs would actually lower the 
economies’ growth rates. However, results from the empirical analysis do not necessarily imply 
that those countries should rush to close their borders. First, caution should be taken in 
interpreting cross-national data, especially when the regressions are not completely robust to 
changes in the list of control variables. More research is needed before any final conclusions can 
be drawn. Second, trade reforms are usually accompanied by other reforms and rarely carried out 
in a ceteris paribus setting. Hence, if combined with institutional improvements, trade 
liberalisation carries the potential of a twofold gain. One can also argue that trade reform in itself 
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can be used to positively promote the institutional environment (see for instance Rodrik and 
Rigobon 2004, Rodrik 2000). Third, trade may be essential for economic growth in countries 
with poorly developed institutions even though complete trade liberalisation in the current 
institutional environment may not. In fact, exchanges of goods and services with the outside 
world can be an important ingredient in any development strategy.  
 
These reservations not withstanding, the empirical analysis does show that trade policies work 
differently in different institutional contexts. Policymakers who seek to promote economic 
growth with scarce administrative resources must therefore ask themselves what the key priorities 
should be. The results could serve as a warning against the idea that trade liberalisation should be 
a universal policy recommendation for growth: The same medicine may not do all patients 
equally good. That may be an argument for taking country specific considerations into account 
when designing trade policy. But perhaps more importantly, the findings can provide some 
indication that trade liberalisation per se may not be the most important contribution to a 
development strategy for countries with weak institutions of conflict management. As such, the 
results may lend support to those researchers who argue that strong institutions are more 
important for long-term growth than outwards orientation. The analysis may also serve as a 
possible explanation for why many studies (for instance Wacziarg and Welch 2003) have found 
the effects of liberalisation to be very heterogeneous. 
 
The findings are in line with the results presented by Chang, Kaltini and Loayza (2005) (CKL), 
another study that looks at the interplay between openness and other variables. Even with the use 
of the trade share in GDP as a measure of openness, they find that the interaction effect with 
institutions is positive. CKL (2005, 27) therefore emphasize that there is a role for policy 
complementarities in designing trade policies: “One policy implication of our analysis is that the 
advisability of trade liberalization may depend on the existence and degree of distortions in non-
trade institutions […] This underscores the need to reject a ‘one size fits all’ approach to trade 
opening in favor of packages that are tailored to the specific circumstances of each country.” 
 
In conclusion, good institutions of conflict management seem necessary to reap the full benefits 
of integration into global markets. Benefits could follow from taking a comprehensive approach 
to trade policy design, taking into consideration both the current status and enhancement potential 
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in institutional quality. The exact steps that lead to such improvement, however, are not clearly 
defined in the institutional literature. Desired mechanisms such as conflict management can be 
achieved through several institutional arrangements, with possible room for country-specific 
adjustments. The general message to policymakers is therefore that institutions of conflict 
management should be given priority, and that more research is needed before specific policy 
implications can be spelled out.  
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Appendix A: Description of variables 
Variable name Description Source Notes 
ASIA Dummy that takes the value 1 if a country is in 
Asia. 
WDI 
(2004) 
Based on WDI definitions, 
the dummy consists of 
regions “South Asia”, “East 
Asia and Pacific” and non-
African countries in “Middle 
East and North Africa” 
GDP00 GDP per capita in 2000 – measured in constant 
1995 int $ PPP units 
WDI 
(2004) 
 
GDP75 GDP per capita in 1975 – measured in constant 
1995 int $ PPP units 
WDI 
(2004) 
 
GROWTH7500 Economic growth from 1975 to 2000. Formula:  
GROWTH7500=100*(1/25)*ln(GDP00/GDP75) 
-  
INSTITUTION 
8400 
Institutional variable that measures the quality of 
a country’s conflict management institutions. 
Based on selected components from the 
International Country Risk Guide (2005) 
governance indicators (table 3B). The following 
components are selected: conflict, religion in 
politics, ethnic tensions, democratic 
accountability, and quality of bureaucracy. 
ICRG 
(2005) 
The index is transformed to 
a 1-10 scale, where higher 
scores represent higher 
quality of institutions.  
INTERACTION Interaction variable between openness and 
institutions. Calculated as follows: 
INTERACTION= 
INSTITUTION8400*TARIFF7500 
-  
LATINAM Dummy that takes the value 1 if a country is in 
Latin America 
WDI 
(2004) 
Consists of region “Latin 
America and Caribbean” 
from WDI definitions. 
LGDP75 Natural logarithm of GDP75. -  
LNINV7500 Natural logarithm of investments measured as a 
percentage of GDP, averaged over period 1975-
2000.  
WDI 
(2004)  
 
LNLIFE75 Natural logarithm of average life expectancy in 
1975. Common proxy for human capital in the 
literature. 
WDI 
(2004) 
1982 data used for Jordan. 
POP75 Population in 1975, measured in million 
inhabitants. 
WDI 
(2004) 
 
SSAFRICA Dummy that takes the values 1 if a country is in 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
WDI 
(2004) 
Consists of region “Sub-
Saharan Africa” from WDI 
definitions. 
TARIFF7500 Mean unweighted tariff rate, averaged over 
period 1975-2000. The data is reported to be 
compiled from several sources (WTO, 
UNCTAD, World Bank). The primary indicator 
seems to be the “simple mean tariff” variable 
from the annually published World Development 
Indicators from the World Bank. 
Fraser 
Institute 
(2005) 
Source data employ an 
index from 1-10 where 10 
represents the lowest 
tariffs. I have chosen to 
reverse the scale to that 1 
represents the highest 
tariffs. 
TRADESH7500 Imports+Exports / GDP – averaged over the 
period 1975-2000. 
WDI 
(2004) 
 
Table A.1. Variable descriptions with notes and sources. Although data availability generally is good, full time series 
data are not available for smaller a group of countries. For the variables TARIFF7500, TRADESH7500, 
LNINV7500, and INSTITUTION8400, simple averages were calculated from available data points. About the 
sources: WDI refers to the World Development Indicators from the World Bank (2004), Fraser Institute to Gwartney 
and Lawson (2005), and ICRG to International Country Risk Guide from Political Risk Services (2005).  
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Variable N Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
ASIA 94 0,21 0,41 0,00 1,00 
GDP00 94 10334,84 10169,94 426,66 51636,82 
GDP75 94 6348,92 5771,09 472,91 25842,39 
GROWTH7500 94 1,42 2,11 -4,82 7,44 
INSTITUTION8400 94 6,94 1,73 3,30 10,00 
INTERACTION 94 23,15 12,24 0,00 53,69 
LATINAM 94 0,23 0,43 0,00 1,00 
LGDP75 94 8,30 1,02 6,16 10,16 
INV7500 94 22,79 5,39 9,61 38,70 
LNINV7500 94 3,10 0,25 2,26 3,66 
LIFE75 94 61,07 10,79 35,08 75,50 
LNLIFE75 94 4,10 0,19 3,56 4,32 
POP75 94 35,86 115,16 0,19 916,40 
SSAFRICA 94 0,21 0,41 0,00 1,00 
TARIFF7500 94 3,64 2,16 0,00 9,86 
TRADESH7500 93 68,65 38,35 16,63 227,11 
Table A2. Statistical descriptions of the variables. 
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Appendix B: Testing the OLS assumptions 
If the assumptions A1-A5 outlined in chapter 7 are not fulfilled, OLS may be an inappropriate 
estimator. I have therefore performed some standard tests to ensure the validity of these 
assumptions. This appendix shows test results mainly for regression R5, the most important 
specification in my analysis. Based on the following results, I do not find evidence to suggest that 
OLS is an inappropriate estimator in the context of this paper. 
 
First, I have used a regression specification error test (RESET) to control the adequacy of the 
model. One version of RESET from Hill et al. (2001, 187) implies integrating the squares of the 
predicted values from R5 as independent variables in the original equation, giving this 
specification: 
 
(A.1) iii YZY εβββ +++= 210 ˆ   
 
Y represents GROWTH7500 and Z a vector of the independent variables in R5. If the coefficient 
1β is significantly different from zero, it may be an indication that the specification is inadequate. 
In the case of R5, 1β  takes the value -0.036, with a standard error of 0.031 and p-value of 0.25. 
At conventional levels of significance, the test is therefore not able to detect any misspecification.  
 
Second, I have investigated for the joint significance of the independent variables with an F-test. 
Results show significance at the 1 % level for R5 (and all regressions R1-R13), indicating that 
the models do have overall explanatory power.  
 
Third, I have looked at the distribution of the residuals in R5. If the expected value of the error 
term is different from zero or if the errors are not normally distributed, the OLS estimator will be 
biased. For large samples (N>50), however, the estimator is still consistent even if the errors are 
non-normally distributed. Figure A.1 gives statistical information about the error terms and 
shows visually that the error terms are fairly normally distributed, although there seems to be 
some presence of fat tails in the distribution. A skewness and kurtosis test is not significant at 
conventional levels, and does not give grounds to reject the assumption that the errors are 
normally distributed. 
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Distribution of residuals in R5
Fr
ac
tio
n
Residuals
-3.41012 2.44911
0
.138298
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Avg: 0,000 
SD: 1,23  
Min: -3,41 
Max: 2,45 
Figure B.1: Distribution of residuals in regression R5. 
 
Fourth, heteroskedasticity in the error terms will imply that the OLS estimator becomes 
inefficient, and more dramatically that the variance of the coefficients is wrongly estimated. Then 
t-test cannot be carried out and inferences cannot be drawn from the estimates. The White test 
(Kennedy 2003, 138) for heteroskedasticity examines whether the variance in the error terms can 
be explained by either the independent variables, theirs squares or their cross-products. When 
conducted on R5, I find that neither the F-test nor t-tests for any of the variables are significant at 
conventional levels. The White test then suggests that the assumption of homoskedastic errors 
cannot be rejected. This assumption is further supported by regressions that I have carried out 
using White’s robust standard errors on all specifications R1-R13. The robust regressions 
changes t-values only by small levels, and in no consistent direction. No variables changed 
significance measured at a 10 % level. Finally, scatter plots between the error term and each of 
the independent variables are shown in figure B.2. A visual inspection shows that none of the 
graphs indicate a clear relationship, and therefore do not give grounds to reject the assumption of 
homoskedastic errors.  
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Figure B.2: Scatter plots showing residuals and  each of the independent variables in regression R5.  
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Appendix C: Sample of countries 
Algeria Honduras Paraguay 
Argentina Hong Kong (China) Peru 
Australia Hungary Philippines 
Austria Iceland Portugal 
Bahamas, The India Senegal 
Bangladesh Indonesia Sierra Leone 
Belgium Iran Singapore* 
Bolivia Ireland South Africa 
Botswana Israel Spain 
Brazil Italy Sri Lanka 
Cameroon Jamaica Sweden 
Canada Japan Switzerland 
Chile Jordan Syrian Arab Republic 
China Kenya Thailand 
Colombia Korea, Rep. (South) Togo 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Kuwait Trinidad and Tobago 
Congo, Rep. Latvia Tunisia 
Costa Rica Luxembourg Turkey 
Cote d'Ivoire Madagascar United Kingdom 
Cyprus Malawi United States 
Denmark Malaysia Uruguay 
Dominican Republic Mali Venezuela 
Ecuador Malta Zambia 
Egypt Mexico Zimbabwe 
El Salvador Morocco  
Finland Netherlands  
France New Zealand  
Gabon Nicaragua  
Germany Niger  
Ghana Nigeria  
Greece Norway  
Guatemala Oman  
Guinea-Bissau Pakistan  
Guyana Panama  
Haiti Papua New Guinea  
 
*) Since trade share data was not available for Singapore, the observation is not included in regressions 
R9 through R13. 
